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I. INTRODUCTION
Five days—only five days—cost George Souliotes, a California state 
prisoner serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, his last 
chance at freedom.1  A federal habeas petition was the last resort for
Souliotes, who had been incarcerated for ten years for three murders 
committed by arson.2  At Souliotes’s second trial, a prosecution witness 
testified that the residue found on Souliotes’s shoes was linked to the
accelerant that ignited the fire.3  However, eight years later, after Souliotes
was convicted and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, an
arson investigator reexamined the evidence and found chemical differences 
between the residue on Souliotes’s shoes and the residue on the carpet
from the scene of the crime.4  This new evidence prompted Souliotes to 
challenge his conviction by filing a federal habeas petition based on his 
substantive actual innocence claim.5  Although the new evidence supported 
his claim of innocence, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Souliotes’s federal
habeas petition as untimely because Souliotes filed his habeas petition 
five days after the one-year limitations period of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),6 which restricts the time within 
1. Souliotes v. Evans, 622 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 654 F.3d 
902 (9th Cir. 2011). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 1176.  The government prosecuted Souliotes twice.  Id.  At the first trial, 
Souliotes’s attorney called fourteen witnesses to testify that the fire was an accident and 
to undermine the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. Id.  After the first trial resulted in
a hung jury, the prosecution tried Souliotes again.  Id.  At the second trial, the same 
attorney called only one witness who had served as a prosecution witness at the first trial.
Id.  The government relied heavily on scientific evidence indicating that a liquid used to
ignite the fire left residues of medium petroleum distillates (MPDs) at the scene. Id.
A prosecution witness testified that Souliotes’s shoes also contained MPDs.  Id.
4. Id. at 1176–77.  In chemical testing before Souliotes’s trials, the same
investigator had concluded that the residue on Souliotes’s shoes and carpet residue likely
came from the same source. Id.
5. Id. at 1177.  In addition to claiming actual innocence, Souliotes claimed 
ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of the Vienna Convention, and juror misconduct.
Id. at 1176.  This Comment, however, will not address these claims.
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which prisoners may file their habeas petitions in federal court asserting 
constitutional violations.7 
Because Souliotes failed to present his constitutional claims in state 
court within the statutory time frame, he procedurally defaulted his claim to
federal habeas corpus relief.8  To overcome this procedural defect in his
petition, Souliotes sought to invoke the innocence gateway under Schlup
v. Delo,9 arguing that despite his untimely filing, he could still pursue his 
claims because his actual innocence overcame the AEDPA one-year 
limitations period.10 Schlup created an actual innocence exception to the 
limitations on state procedural defaults.11 Under this exception, a habeas 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 
of a State court.”).
8. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (“In habeas, the sanction 
for failing to exhaust properly (preclusion of review in federal court) is given the . . . 
name of procedural default . . . .”).  An inmate must first exhaust all state remedies 
within the statute of limitations period established by the state before seeking any federal 
judicial remedies.  If the individual procedurally defaults a claim, a federal court will not 
usually consider the petitioner’s claims.  See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
9. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).  Schlup, a Missouri prisoner, was convicted of 
participating in the murder of a fellow inmate and was sentenced to death. Id. at 301–02. 
In his second federal habeas petition, Schlup claimed that he was actually innocent of the
crime and therefore should be allowed to present his otherwise procedurally barred
constitutional claims—ineffective assistance of trial counsel and failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence by the State.  Id. at 307.  The Court held that if a petitioner brings
forth new evidence and establishes that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable 
juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence,” he may overcome the 
procedural barriers that would otherwise bar his path and have a federal court consider
his habeas petition on the merits.  Id. at 327–28. 
10. Souliotes, 622 F.3d at 1177.  Souliotes additionally argued that his petition was 
entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(D), which provides that the one-year limitation 
period shall run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the . . . claims presented 
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(D); Souliotes, 622 F.3d at 1177.  Based on a docket entry at the California 
Court of Appeal, Souliotes’s counsel miscalculated the number of days remaining for 
Souliotes to file his habeas petition.  Souliotes, 622 F.3d at 1177.  Souliotes therefore 
sought equitable tolling based on the newly discovered evidence of his innocence, or
alternatively, based on exceptional circumstances that caused his tardiness. Id.
11. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28.  The Supreme Court defined the scope of the
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” doctrine in Schlup, enabling a court to overcome
procedural barriers and consider the merits of a petitioner’s habeas corpus claims.  Id. at
327–28.  The fundamental miscarriage of justice doctrine holds that if a habeas petitioner
establishes that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, his 
wrongful conviction and imprisonment constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).  The actual innocence exception
has also gained recognition in situations where a procedural default resulted from 





























   
petitioner’s otherwise barred constitutional claims may be considered on 
the merits if the petitioner demonstrates with new evidence that “more 
likely than not . . . no reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”12  Prisoners rarely meet this extremely 
high burden because the standard for proving innocence is so high.13 
Nevertheless, if a petitioner whose petition for habeas corpus is procedurally 
barred makes a sufficient showing of actual innocence, a federal court
may consider the merits of the habeas petition on remand.14  Therefore, a
showing of actual innocence under Schlup is “not itself a constitutional
claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must
pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the 
merits.”15 
Prior to its en banc decision in Lee v. Lampert,16 the Ninth Circuit
narrowly construed the AEDPA’s limitations period, finding that an 
599 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).  Additionally, following the 
passage of the AEDPA, the courts of appeals continued to apply the Schlup actual 
innocence exception to cases involving other types of procedural default, such as where 
the default is based on adequate and independent state-law grounds.  See, e.g., Williams 
v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 973 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing availability of fundamental
miscarriage of justice doctrine after passage of the AEDPA but concluding appellant 
failed to meet the actual innocence standard); Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 341 (3d
Cir. 2004) (same); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining 
that appellant presented enough evidence to demonstrate that he was actually innocent). 
12. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006) 
(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 
13. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321 (stating that habeas petitions advancing a substantial
claim of actual innocence are “extremely rare”); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 426–27 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[C]laims of actual innocence . . . must 
be reserved for the truly extraordinary case . . . .”); Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 96
(3d Cir. 2010) (describing Schlup as a “‘rare’ remedy that is only available in an
‘extraordinary’ case” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321)); Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d
933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that the miscarriage of justice exception is 
limited to those extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his innocence and 
establishes that the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.”).
14. See, e.g., House, 547 U.S. at 555 (finding that House satisfied “the gateway 
standard set forth in Schlup” and allowing him to proceed on remand with procedurally
defaulted constitutional claims); Souter, 395 F.3d at 602 (finding that Souter had
satisfied Schlup’s actual innocence requirement and instructing the district court to 
consider the merits of his habeas petition on remand); Silva v. Wood, 14 F. App’x 803, 
805 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the totality of the evidence before the court was 
sufficient to establish a gateway showing of innocence); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d
463, 478–79 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that Carriger satisfied the Schlup gateway standard 
to permit consideration of his constitutional claims). 
15. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404).  Schlup’s claim of 
innocence did not by itself provide a basis for any substantive relief, such as a new trial 
or having his conviction vacated. Id.; cf. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (considering, without 
accepting or rejecting, a petitioner’s argument that innocence may alone constitute 
grounds for federal habeas relief). 
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actual innocence exception does not exist.17  In holding that a credible
claim of actual innocence is not an equitable exception to the AEDPA’s
one-year statute of limitations, the court would inevitably force an
actually innocent person who files a habeas petition even one day past 
the one-year limitations period to remain incarcerated or to even be 
executed.18  The Ninth Circuit maintained this position until August 2, 
2011.19 
17. See Souliotes v. Evans, 622 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 654 F.3d 
902 (9th Cir. 2011).  Prior to its en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
omission of actual innocence from the enumerated list of exceptions in the statutory text 
was significant: 
Since section 2244(d) comprises six paragraphs defining its one-year limitations 
period in detail and adopting very specific exceptions . . . , Congress likely did 
not conceive that the courts would add new exceptions and it is even more 
doubtful that it would have approved of such an effort.  It is not our place to
engraft an additional judge-made exception onto congressional language that is 
clear on its face . . . . 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 
2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d en banc, 653 F.3d at 929). 
18. See, e.g., Larsen v. Adams, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (exemplifying
the critical importance of preserving the actual innocence gateway with regard to the 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period).  Larsen was convicted of possessing a 
dagger after a police officer testified that Larsen threw a dagger under a car as the officer
arrived on the scene.  Id. at 1206–08.  The prosecution charged Larsen’s possession as a 
felony instead of a misdemeanor. Id. at 1206.  Because Larsen admitted to three prior
felony convictions, the conviction of possession of a dagger triggered California’s Three 
Strikes Law, which resulted in a sentence of twenty-eight years to life imprisonment.  Id.
at 1207.  Larsen claimed that his trial attorney failed to locate, investigate, and bring to
trial exculpatory witnesses who had seen someone other than Larsen throw the dagger
under the car and failed to present evidence of third-party culpability. Id. at 1206, 1221. 
Specifically, Larsen had informed his counsel that William Hewitt was the person with
the knife and that two persons, Mr. and Mrs. McNutt, were in the parking lot and “saw 
everything.”  Id. at 1231.  However, Larsen’s attorney did not investigate this information. Id.
The district court held that because the trial attorney’s failure to investigate “severely 
prejudiced [Larsen’s] defense” and the newly identified witnesses provided strong
evidence contradicting the allegations made against Larsen, “no reasonable juror [having
heard this exculpatory evidence] would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id. at 1232; see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (articulating actual innocence 
standard for overcoming procedural bar).  The district court found Larsen’s federal habeas
petition meritorious and granted his release. Larsen, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. However, 
if Larsen had filed his habeas petition before the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Lee 
v. Lampert, Larsen would never have been released, regardless of the compelling
evidence of his actual innocence.
19. Lee, 653 F.3d at 934 (recognizing an actual innocence exception to the 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations). Since its en banc decision in Lee, the Ninth Circuit has 
maintained the position that a credible showing of actual innocence under Schlup
excuses the one-year statute of limitations period set forth by the AEDPA.  See, e.g., 
































In its en banc decision in Lee v. Lampert, the Ninth Circuit effectively 
changed the circuit’s rules by holding that a credible showing of actual 
innocence under Schlup v. Delo excuses the AEDPA’s one-year statute
of limitations period.20  The court’s holding not only altered the course 
of federal habeas petitions within the Ninth Circuit but also tipped the 
scale in favor of recognizing the exception for the first time among
federal circuit courts that have considered this question.21  Specifically, 
the court held that “a petitioner is not barred by the AEDPA statute of 
25, 2012) (applying the Schlup actual innocence standard but finding that the petitioner’s 
allegations were insufficient to meet the gateway standard); Fernandez v. McEwen, No. 
1:10 cv 00626 AWI SKO HC, 2012 WL 15059, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (“[T]he
Petitioner has not presented new, reliable evidence that renders it more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.”); 
United States v. Tsosie, Nos. CV 10 8095 PCT PGR (JRI), CR 94 0031 PCT PGR, 2011 
WL 5519932, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2011) (finding that the movant was “not entitled
to the equitable exception for actual innocence because he failed to proffer, much less
produce, any post-conviction evidence that would permit him to pass through the Schlup
gateway”). 
20. Lee, 653 F.3d at 945.  The district court held that a showing of actual
innocence tolls the AEDPA’s limitations period and concluded that Lee made the 
requisite showing.  Lee v. Lampert, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1216–21 (D. Or. 2009), rev’d,
610 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 653 F.3d at 929.  After finding that Lee 
established his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court vacated Lee’s 
conviction and sentence and allowed the State of Oregon to retry the case in 120 days or
release him. Id. at 1226.  The State appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court.  Lee, 610 F.3d at 1136. As a matter of first impression, the Ninth Circuit panel
held that there is no actual innocence exception to override the AEDPA’s statute of
limitations and dismissed Lee’s petition as time barred.  Id. at 1133–34, 1136.  The Ninth 
Circuit granted rehearing en banc.  Lee v. Lampert, 633 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011). 
The en banc court held that a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable 
exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Lee, 653 F.3d at 931.  Nevertheless, 
because the Ninth Circuit found that the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence of 
actual innocence to permit review of his constitutional claims on the merits, the court
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lee’s
petition as untimely. Id. at 945. 
21. See id.  Until August 2011, the majority of circuit courts that considered this
question declined to recognize an actual innocence exception. See, e.g., Lee, 610 F.3d at 
1136; Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2005); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d
343, 347–48 (1st Cir. 2003); Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002). 
After the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lee, four circuits have expressly recognized that 
actual innocence is a valid argument for equitable tolling of time-barred habeas petitions.
See San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2011); Lopez v. Trani, 
628 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 2010); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 602 (6th Cir. 
2005).  Four other circuits have refused to decide the issue, finding that the petitioner 
would not have met the burden of proof of actual innocence in that specific case, but not 
reaching whether the statute of limitations is entitled to equitable tolling. See Horning v. 
Lavan, 197 F. App’x 90, 93 (3d Cir. 2006); Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 160–61 (2d
Cir. 2004); Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2002); Fields v. Johnson, No. 
7:06-CV-00701, 2007 WL 45641, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2007) (stating that the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not held that actual innocence is a ground for
equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s limitations period), appeal dismissed, 225 F. App’x
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limitations from filing an otherwise untimely habeas petition if the
petitioner makes a credible showing of ‘actual innocence’ under Schlup
v. Delo.”22  In light of the intervening en banc decision in Lee, the Ninth 
Circuit reopened the possibility that Souliotes could, by way of the 
actual innocence gateway under Schlup, present his otherwise time-barred 
claims.23  On remand, the district court granted an evidentiary hearing on 
Souliotes’s admission of new scientific evidence that refuted the key
evidence linking him to the residential fire that killed three people.24 
The district court subsequently found that Souliotes had made a sufficient
showing of actual innocence to serve as an equitable exception to the
AEDPA’s statute of limitations.25 
The en banc court’s decision in Lee addressed the core objective of 
our criminal judicial system—protect the innocent and convict the guilty.26 
22. Lee, 653 F.3d at 945.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[a]t the time of AEDPA’s 
passage, federal courts had equitable discretion to hear the merits of procedurally-
defaulted habeas claims where the failure to do so would result in a ‘fundamental 
miscarriage of justice,’ such as the conviction of an actually innocent person.”  Id. at
933–34 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991)).  Thus, the court held that 
Congress did not remove the equitable power of federal courts in habeas proceedings in
passing AEDPA.  Id. at 936. Additionally, the court found that an actual innocence 
exception to the limitations period is consistent with the AEDPA’s underlying principles 
of finality, comity, and judicial conservation. Id. at 935.  Finally, the Ninth Circuit relied 
on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to support its conclusion.  Id. at 936 
(explaining that denying federal habeas relief from an actually innocent petitioner would 
be “constitutionally problematic” (quoting Souter, 395 F.3d at 601)). 
23. Souliotes v. Evans, 654 F.3d 902, 902 (9th Cir. 2011).  Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit vacated its opinion in Souliotes, reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
Souliotes’s habeas petition as untimely, and remanded for proceedings consistent with 
the en banc decision in Lee v. Lampert.  Id.
24. Souliotes v. Hedgpeth, No. 1:06-cv-00667 AWI MJS HC, 2011 WL 4433098,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2011).  The court held a three-day evidentiary hearing in
January 2012 on Souliotes’s actual innocence gateway claim under Schlup and his claims 
of statutory tolling based on diligence.  Petitioner’s Opening Post-Hearing Brief at 6 n.1,
Souliotes v. Hedgpeth, No. 1:06-cv-00667 AWI MJS HC, 2012 WL 2684972 (E.D. Cal. 
July 6, 2012), ECF No. 138.  After the hearing, the parties filed posthearing briefs.  See, 
e.g., Petitioner’s Opening Post-Hearing Brief, supra. 
25. Souliotes, 2012 WL 2684972, at *4 (adopting the magistrate judge’s Findings
and Recommendation and determining that the new scientific evidence and the
unreliability of the prosecution’s eyewitness constituted a sufficient showing of actual 
innocence); see also Souliotes v. Hedgpeth, No. 1:06-cv-00667 AWI MJS HC, 2012 WL
1458087, at *64 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendation). 
26. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as 
bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”).  This basic value is embodied 
in several provisions of the U.S. Constitution, such as the right to remain silent, the right
1289
 



















   
    
 
 








However, several circuits disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in 
Lee, maintaining that a credible claim of actual innocence does not
constitute an exception, under any circumstances, to the AEDPA’s one-
year limitations period.27  This active circuit split illustrates the struggle
inmates continue to face when attempting to overcome procedural
barriers preventing federal courts from considering their habeas petitions 
on the merits.28 
Since the enactment of the AEDPA in 1996, the Supreme Court has 
affirmed that Schlup remains the standard to review gateway innocence
claims.29  Furthermore, the Court recently held in Holland v. Florida that
the one-year statute of limitations regarding a petition for federal habeas 
relief by state prisoners is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 
cases.30  However, the Supreme Court has yet to address whether “actual 
innocence” is an exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations period.31 
to counsel, and the right to a jury in criminal prosecutions.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V,
VI.
27. See, e.g., Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The
legal shortcoming is that ‘actual innocence’ is unrelated to the statutory timeliness 
rules.”); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 2003) (“In particular, the statutory
one-year limit on filing initial habeas petitions is not mitigated by any statutory 
exception for actual innocence even though Congress clearly knew how to provide such
an escape hatch.”); Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The one-year
limitation period established by § 2244(d) contains no explicit exemption for petitioners 
claiming actual innocence of the crimes of which they have been convicted.”).
28. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996) (“Dismissal of a first federal 
habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the petitioner the 
protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an important interest in human 
liberty.”).
29. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537–39 (2006).  The Supreme Court held that
for a death row inmate to obtain review of his procedurally barred claims, he must meet
the Schlup gateway standard by introducing new and substantial evidence that the jury
was not able to examine at trial. Id.
30. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).  In Holland, the Supreme 
Court held that the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling because it is nonjurisdictional 
and therefore “subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’” Id.
(quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)).  The Court 
concluded that although the AEDPA was enacted with the purpose of eliminating delays
in the process of federal habeas review, the statute can still achieve its purpose without 
undermining the basic equitable principle of habeas corpus, under which a petition’s
timeliness has historically been determined by equitable standards. Id. at 2562. 
31. At first blush, one might think an actual innocence exception would be 
subsumed within the equitable tolling doctrine.  Although both equitable exceptions can
often be blurred together, an actual innocence exception is separate and distinct from the
equitable tolling doctrine.  Under the Schlup gateway exception, petitioners must
supplement their claims of actual innocence with claims of an independent constitutional 
violation of federal law occurring in the state criminal proceeding to pass through the 
gateway and argue the merits of their underlying claims.  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
316 (1995).  In other words, a petitioner must contend that a constitutional violation has 
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.  Without any new evidence of
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Because the federal courts apply equitable principles to the AEDPA’s
statute of limitations in a variety of contexts,32 it would be inconsistent
for courts not to excuse untimely filings by those whose claims invoke 
the “ultimate equity”—actual innocence.33  As the Ninth Circuit explained
in Lee, it would be fundamentally inconsistent that “under Holland, a 
petitioner could receive the benefit of equitable tolling for attorney error
and yet be denied habeas review upon making a credible showing of
actual innocence.”34 
This Comment argues that to neutralize this potential inequality, the 
Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Lee 
v. Lampert, finding that a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes 
an equitable exception to the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations 
period.  District courts must be able to call on their equitable powers, 
including both equitable principles already applied to the AEDPA’s statute
of limitations as well as the actual innocence exception, in determining 
whether a district court may consider the merits of a criminal defendant’s 
otherwise untimely habeas petition. 
Part II discusses the role of federal habeas corpus relief, the emergence of
actual innocence in Supreme Court jurisprudence, and the relevant 
aspects of the AEDPA.  Part III explains the purpose and application of 
statutes of limitations and discusses reasons a court should exercise its 
power to equitably toll the AEDPA’s limitations period.  Part IV explores
whether an actual innocence exception is necessary.  This Part also 
examines the current split among the circuits and the reasoning and policy 
behind each circuit’s respective decision.  Part V recommends that the
itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice that would allow a habeas court to 
reach the merits of a barred claim.”  Id.  On the other hand, the doctrine of equitable
tolling does not require a claim of constitutional error.  Instead, the doctrine of equitable
tolling permits a court to suspend a statutory deadline when, despite due diligence, some
external factor beyond the defendant’s control prevents the defendant from meeting the 
strict statutory deadline.  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562; see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549
U.S. 327, 336 (2007). 
32. See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
33. The Supreme Court has consistently supported the principle that “habeas 
corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 319.  Moreover, the 
Court has emphasized that the interest in avoiding injustice is most significant in the
context of actual innocence.  Id. at 324–25 (proclaiming that the quintessential miscarriage
of justice is the execution of an innocent person). 
34. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 935 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564); see also Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 





























Supreme Court adopt the gateway standard of actual innocence for equitable
tolling of time-barred petitions and thereby harmonize already-applied 
equitable exceptions and the actual innocence exception to the AEDPA’s 
one-year limitations period.  This Part discusses the policy implications
of and the most likely counterarguments against recognizing actual
innocence as an equitable exception to the AEDPA deadline.  This Part
then revisits Souliotes and other cases to highlight the critical role of the
actual innocence gateway under Schlup in ensuring the equitable 
application of the AEDPA to federal habeas petitions.  Part VI reiterates 
that the Supreme Court should recognize both avenues for equitable 
tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
II. FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF AND EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS 
Habeas corpus is the ultimate equitable remedy for individuals
unconstitutionally deprived of their liberty.35  For centuries, the “Great 
Writ” has served as an essential safeguard of a person’s legal and
constitutional rights.36  As the Supreme Court has recognized, habeas 
petitions protect innocent defendants against unjust incarcerations that 
violate fundamental fairness.37 
35. Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum—also known as the “Great Writ”—literally 
means “you have the body to submit to.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009). 
A writ of habeas corpus directs a prison warden to bring a prisoner before a court to
ensure that the inmate’s imprisonment or detention is lawful.  Id.  The court may order 
that the prisoner be released from incarceration if the prisoner can successfully prove 
that the imprisonment violates a constitutional right.  See John H. Blume & David P. 
Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, 47 S.C. L. 
REV. 271, 272–73 (1996) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963), overruled on
other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)) (stating that habeas
corpus reinforces the principle that an individual is entitled to immediate release if the 
individual’s imprisonment cannot be shown to conform to due process). 
36. In seventeenth-century England, the King’s high court had discretion to issue 
writs of habeas corpus to bring forth prisoners to inquire into the legality of their 
imprisonments.  WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 4 
(1980).  In the United States, the common-law writ of habeas corpus safeguarded the
integrity of the criminal justice process. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 
201–02 (1830).  The U.S. Constitution recognizes the Great Writ in the Suspension
Clause, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  Through legislation, Congress provided federal courts 
the power to grant writs of habeas corpus to “any person,” including federal prisoners 
and state prisoners, detained “in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of 
the United States.”  Habeas Corpus Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385;
see also Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82.  In the Act of
June 25, 1948, Congress codified existing federal habeas corpus statutes and judicial 
habeas practice at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 to 2255. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 
80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 964–67 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255 (2006)). 
37. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes,
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A.  The Role of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions 
After being convicted of a crime, an inmate has several legal avenues 
available to challenge a conviction or sentence.38  A prisoner may first 
challenge a conviction directly through one or more appeals.39  If the 
appeals are unsuccessful, the prisoner may collaterally attack a conviction 
by filing a writ of habeas corpus in state court.40  Finally, if the prisoner
fails to obtain relief in state court, the inmate may file a habeas petition 
in federal court asserting that the incarceration violates the inmate’s
constitutional rights.41  The habeas petition is a prisoner-initiated civil
action that provides collateral review of the legality of the prisoner’s 
criminal conviction.42  When a federal court grants a prisoner’s petition 
protection against convictions that violate fundamental fairness).  The Supreme Court 
looks at each case individually to determine whether the incarceration of a criminal 
defendant violates the defendant’s federal right to due process. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET 
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.4(e), at 612 (3d ed. 2007). The Court has explained that it 
may intervene only when there is an infringement upon the “fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”  Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 
(1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325,
330 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[E]quity must be reserved for those rare instances where . . . it 
would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross 
injustice would result.”).
38. See Jordan M. Barry, Prosecuting the Exonerated: Actual Innocence and the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, 64 STAN. L. REV. 535, 549 (2012). 
39. Id. 
40. Id.  A petition for writ of habeas corpus is a “collateral attack” on the final 
judgment or sentence of a criminal trial.  See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 482– 
83 (1986) (using the terms habeas corpus and collateral review interchangeably). 
A habeas corpus proceeding may not be used to obtain a new trial or as an appeal or writ 
of error to correct, modify, or revise the judgment of a conviction, sentence, or order. 
See, e.g., Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1963) (drawing a distinction 
between a “[d]irect attack” on a criminal judgment and “collateral proceedings,” like 
habeas corpus proceedings); Wallace v. Willingham, 351 F.2d 299, 300 (10th Cir. 1965)
(stating that habeas corpus does not provide a method to review judgments in proceedings
to vacate a sentence).
41. Barry, supra note 38, at 549; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).  Section 
2254(a) provides that the courts “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  After the writ is filed, the federal court
entertaining the petition will “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to
show cause why the writ should not be granted” and the court will then set a hearing
date.  Id. § 2243. 
42. Karen M. Marshall, Finding Time for Federal Habeas Corpus: Carey v. 
Saffold, 37 AKRON L. REV. 549, 554 n.23 (2004) (“In theory, a federal habeas corpus 







































for habeas corpus, the court is generally ruling that the conviction or 
sentence violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights.43 
Before seeking any federal judicial remedies, however, the inmate
must first exhaust all state remedies44 because state criminal proceedings
are the principal means through which to determine the guilt or innocence
of criminal defendants.45  Finality and comity are “society’s interest[s] in 
the efficiency of the criminal justice process,” in that the process will
“swiftly and certainly punish one who violates the law” and ensure the
“accuracy of judgments.”46  If the petitioner does not exhaust the state
determine the validity of his current detention.  In substance, a habeas action constitutes 
a collateral challenge to the prisoner’s treatment in state court.” (quoting Larry W.
Yackle, The American Bar Association and Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1998))). 
43. See Barry, supra note 38, at 554.  A federal court may grant a habeas corpus 
petition if, for example, “the performance of the individual’s trial lawyer was so 
deficient that it failed to satisfy the requirements of the right to counsel, if the trial court
deprived the individual of the right to confront the witnesses against her, or if the trial
court imposed a cruel and unusual sentence.”  Id. at 554–55 (footnotes omitted). 
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  The exhaustion doctrine is “principally designed
to protect the state courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption 
of state judicial proceedings.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).  Comity, the
respect one political entity shows another, is often described as part of federalism—“that 
federal courts should respect the determinations of state courts regarding the adjudication 
of constitutional claims.”  Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s 
Habeas Reform, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 489 (1995). 
45. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 
880, 887 (1983) (“Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.”),
superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2006), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473 (2000). 
46. Daniel M. Bradley, Jr., Comment, Schlup v. Delo: The Burden of Showing
Actual Innocence in Habeas Corpus Review and Congress’ Efforts at Reform, 23 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 463, 485–86 (1997); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 
499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (discussing the importance of finality in the context of federal 
review of state convictions).  Despite the extensive delays that may occur in habeas 
cases, however, the Supreme Court explained that delay should not deter the court from
“withholding relief so clearly called for.”  Peter Sessions, Swift Justice?: Imposing a
Statute of Limitations on the Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1533 n.110 (1997) (quoting Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 164– 
65 (1957)).  The Court further noted that 
the overriding responsibility of [the Supreme] Court is to the Constitution of
the United States, no matter how late it may be that a violation of the 
Constitution is found to exist.  This Court may not disregard the Constitution
because an appeal . . . has been made on the eve of execution.
Chessman, 354 U.S. at 165.  Furthermore, although the government has a legitimate 
interest in finality, the Supreme Court has ruled that “[c]onventional notions of finality
of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of 
constitutional rights is alleged.”  Sessions, supra, at 1533–34 (quoting Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If the government is to 
be “accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment,” access to the courts on
habeas corpus must not be impeded.  Sanders, 373 U.S. at 8 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372
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remedies within the statute of limitations period established by the state, 
the petitioner will “procedurally default” a claim to federal habeas corpus
relief.47  A federal court will generally refuse to consider any arguments 
raised in a habeas corpus petition when the individual procedurally
defaulted a claim.48 
Additionally, federal courts may dismiss a prisoner’s subsequent habeas 
corpus petitions on the ground that the petitioner is abusing the writ.49 
Because the scope of federal postconviction review raises issues of comity,
finality, and the conservation of judicial resources,50 courts attempt to 
strike a proper balance between unlimited costly litigation and 
unconstitutional incarceration.51  Thus, federal courts have equitable 
discretion to hear the merits of habeas petitions claiming procedural
failings to avoid a fundamental “miscarriage of justice.”52  Equitable 
47. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (defining procedural default).
The procedural-default rule “bars federal review of a state prisoner’s federal constitutional
claims denied by the state court for failure to comply with a state procedural requirement, 
such as the form or timing of a post-trial motion.”  Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual 
Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal 
Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 2101, 2121 (2002). 
48. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996) (“[P]rocedural bar . . . prevents 
federal habeas corpus review of the defaulted claim, unless the petitioner can 
demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default.”).  A federal court may bar a state 
prisoner from seeking federal habeas relief if the state court denied the prisoner’s federal 
claim on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.  Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991), abrogated in part by Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 
(2012).  However, if the petitioner shows cause and prejudice for the state procedural
waiver, the petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims will be eligible for federal habeas 
relief.  Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 (1977). 
49. See Zheng, supra note 47, at 2121–22 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006)).
Petitioners may abuse successive petitions, which “raise identical grounds to those raised
and dismissed on the merits in a prior habeas corpus petition,” or second petitions, which 
“raise grounds that were previously available but not relied upon.”  Id. (citing Kuhlmann 
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986)).
50. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (discussing the AEDPA’s
purpose of furthering “the principles of comity, finality, and federalism”). 
51. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 448 n.8 (arguing that each court that considers the
scope of habeas corpus review does so by balancing competing interests). Compare, 
e.g., Fay, 372 U.S. at 424 (concluding that individual liberty outweighed concerns for 
finality and federalism), with Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 293 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (“[H]abeas review . . . ‘disturbs the State’s significant interest in repose for 
concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish some admitted offenders, and 
intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial 
authority.’” (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 210 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring))). 
52. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991).  “[H]abeas corpus has 























exceptions help ensure that finality and efficiency do not undermine the 
value of federal habeas corpus for defendants.53 
B.  The Emergence of Actual Innocence in Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has developed a standard of actual innocence54 for
habeas corpus petitions in a series of cases.55  These decisions ensured 
“the equitable discretion of habeas courts to see that . . . constitutional 
errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons.”56 
Starting in the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
held that courts must hear a successive petition when required by the 
447 (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 438); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995) 
(“[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy.”).  The history of habeas corpus is
“inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. . . . 
[I]ts function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society 
deems to be intolerable restraints.” Fay, 372 U.S. at 401–02. 
53. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 448 (describing the proper scope of habeas corpus
as a “sensitive weighing of the interests implicated”); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1, 8 (1963) (“Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or 
liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.”).
54. In the context of federal petitions for habeas corpus, actual innocence can be 
explained as follows: 
A prototypical example of “actual innocence” in a colloquial sense is the case 
where the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime.  Such claims are 
of course regularly made on motions for new trial after conviction in both state 
and federal courts, and quite regularly denied because the evidence adduced in
support of them fails to meet the rigorous standards for granting such motions. 
But in rare instances it may turn out later, for example, that another person has 
credibly confessed to the crime, and it is evident that the law has made a 
mistake.  In [this] context . . . , the concept of “actual innocence” is easy to grasp. 
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340–41 (1992). 
55. See infra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.  Before Congress enacted the
AEDPA, the Supreme Court applied a differential standard of proof for innocence-based
claims, depending on whether the petitioner claimed that he or she was innocent in 
regard to the punishment or actually innocent of the crime charged.  When a petitioner 
claimed ineligibility of the punishment, the Court held that “one must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have 
found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law.” 
Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336.  However, when a petitioner claims actual innocence— 
innocence of the crime charged—the petitioner must show that “it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326–27 (“[W]e hold that the Carrier ‘probably resulted’ standard 
rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the miscarriage of justice 
inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual 
innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of his 
constitutional claims.” (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986))). 
56. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (quoting McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 
502) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The fundamental miscarriage of justice 
exception is available “only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with 
a colorable showing of factual innocence.”  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454.  The Supreme 
Court has never held that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception extends to
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“ends of justice.”57  The Court adopted an exception to procedurally 
barred habeas petitions under the concept of “cause and prejudice,” 
under which a petitioner must show “cause for the noncompliance and
. . . actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.”58 
Recognizing that the courts’ stringent application of the “cause-and-
prejudice standard” might result in a “miscarriage of justice,”59 the Supreme
Court held that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation 
has likely resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a 
court may grant a writ of habeas corpus, even in the absence of a showing 
of cause for the procedural default.60 
Although the Supreme Court held that the mere existence of “newly
discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a 
ground for relief on federal habeas corpus,”61 the Court in Schlup v. Delo
57. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15–17.  Successive petitions are those that raise identical 
grounds to those raised and dismissed on the merits in a prior habeas corpus petition. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006).  The burden is on the applicant to show that, although 
the court dismissed the ground of the new application on the merits in a prior application,
determining for a second time the legal basis to grant the relief sought by the applicant 
would better serve the ends of justice. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17. 
58. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 87 (1977).  Cause requires a showing 
that “‘some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts’ to raise 
the claim.” McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).  For example,
interference by officials that makes compliance with the state’s procedural rule
impracticable, the unavailability of the factual or legal basis for a claim, and ineffective 
assistance of counsel are objective factors that may constitute cause.  Id. at 494 (citing
Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).  To demonstrate prejudice, a prisoner must show “not merely
that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his 
actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions.”  United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). 
59. There are few circumstances under which a habeas petitioner can overcome a 
procedural barrier.  See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495 (observing that the cause and prejudice 
exception is premised on concerns for comity and finality rather than concerns for a
petitioner’s constitutional rights).
60. Id. at 495–96. On direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Carrier’s trial
counsel failed to include in the petition a claim that the defendant had been denied due
process by the prosecution’s withholding of the victim’s statements.  Id. at 482.  The 
Supreme Court found that the trial counsel’s performance on direct appeal did not
constitute cause to excuse a procedural default. Id. at 497.  The Court held that any
attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause for a 
procedural default. Id.  However, the Court noted that in “‘appropriate cases’ the 
principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice ‘must 
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.’”  Id. at 495
(quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). 
61. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398 (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 
(1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992)).  A jury convicted 

































held that a petitioner may have his or her otherwise barred constitutional 
claim considered on the merits when it is accompanied by a claim of
innocence.62 Thus, a petitioner who claims actual innocence must also 
plead an independent constitutional error or violation of federal law 
occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal proceeding.  In
other words, to overcome the procedural default, the petitioner must first
make a sufficient showing of actual innocence to pass through the gateway 
and have the court consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying 
claims.63  The court may then grant habeas relief if the court concludes
that such relief is merited.64  To establish a proper showing of actual
innocence, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence, “it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the
defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”65  In making this  
determination, the reviewing court should not limit itself to the evidence 
Id. at 394.  Seven months later, Herrera pled guilty to the related murder of officer David 
Rucker. Id.  Ten years after his conviction, in a second federal habeas proceeding, 
Herrera claimed that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that he was actually
innocent of the murders of both Carrisalez and Rucker.  Id. at 396–97.  Herrera 
supported his claim with affidavits tending to show that his now-dead brother had
committed the murders, but he did not allege an independent constitutional violation
during his trial.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that Herrera’s claim was not cognizable on 
federal habeas absent an accompanying federal constitutional violation. Id. at 404–05. 
62. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995) (“Schlup’s claim of innocence is 
thus ‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas 
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the
merits.’” (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404)).  The Court distinguished between a 
substantive Herrera claim and a procedural Schlup claim. See id. at 315–16 (“[W]hen a 
petitioner has been ‘tried before a jury of his peers, with the full panoply of protections 
that our Constitution affords criminal defendants . . . it is appropriate to apply an
‘extraordinarily high’ standard of review.” (citations omitted) (quoting Herrera, 506
U.S. at 419, 426 (O’Connor, J., concurring))).  Because Schlup’s claim of innocence was
accompanied by an assertion of constitutional error at trial, the Court found that his
conviction “may not be entitled to the same degree of respect as one, such as Herrera’s,
that is the product of an error-free trial.”  Id. at 316. 
63. Id. (“Without any new evidence of innocence, even the existence of a 
concededly meritorious constitutional violation is not in itself sufficient to establish a
miscarriage of justice that would allow a habeas court to reach the merits of a barred 
claim.”).
64. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d)(1) (2006) (permitting federal courts to
grant writs of habeas corpus based on a violation of the Constitution or federal law).
65. Id. at 327 (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 496); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 
518, 538 (2006) (noting that the Schlup standard does not require “absolute certainty”). 
“It is not the district court’s independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists 
that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district court to make a 
probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that when applying 
Schlup, “‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); see also Calderon v. Thompson, 523 
U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (“[T]he miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with actual as 
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introduced at trial, but instead consider all the evidence, including 
evidence that has become available only after the trial.66 
Even if a court finds that an actual innocence exception applies to a
particular case, the claim is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead
an opportunity for the habeas petitioner to have the court consider the 
petitioner’s otherwise barred constitutional claim on the merits.67 
Specifically, a petitioner who makes a sufficient showing of actual
innocence to excuse the AEDPA’s statute of limitations period is not
entitled to any substantive relief at this stage; rather, a claim of innocence
under Schlup is solely procedural.68 
C.  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
The AEDPA, which Congress enacted one year after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Schlup, represents a distinct change in direction for 
the function of habeas corpus petitions.  The AEDPA’s procedural
requirements are quite complicated and are often misunderstood by pro 
se petitioner-inmates as well as attorneys.69  Among other provisions, the
AEDPA bans successive petitions, which raise identical grounds to those 
raised and dismissed on the merits in a prior habeas corpus petition, and 
thus requires defendants to put all of their claims into one petition.70 
Substantively, the Act only allows habeas corpus claims to succeed
where the convictions were contrary to “clearly established Federal law” 
66. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328 (stating that when considering the petitioner’s innocence,
the federal court should look at all the evidence “alleged to have been illegally admitted” and 
evidence “tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only
after the trial” (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1971))). 
67. Id. at 315 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404). 
68. A petitioner’s claim of innocence alone does not provide substantive relief,
such as granting a new trial or having the conviction vacated.  See id. at 314–15; see also
Barry, supra note 38, at 552. 
69. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Even with the benefit 
of legal training, ready access to legal materials and the aid of four years of additional 
case law, an informed calculation of [the prisoner’s] tolling period evaded both his 
appointed counsel and the expertise of a federal magistrate judge.”).  Due to its 
complexity and resulting confusion, the Supreme Court has even reviewed the AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations twelve times since it was enacted in 1996.  Anne R. Traum, Last 
Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. 
L. REV. 545, 553 (2009). 


























or based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”71 
More significantly for this Comment, in enacting the AEDPA, Congress 
set forth a one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which 
governs state prisoners’ federal habeas corpus petitions.72  The one-year 
period of limitation runs from the latest of several events listed in
§ 2244(d)(1),73 of which the most common is “the date on which the 
judgment became final, [either] by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of time for seeking [direct] review.”74  The statute of limitations
does not reset after each filing; rather, the one-year limitations period set 
forth in the AEDPA will continue to run and can expire as defendants 
await resolution of their state claims before attempting to file federal
petitions.75  Further, although the statute of limitations provides for
tolling during periods in which the petitioner seeks state postconviction 
71. Id. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). 
72. Id. § 2244(d)(1).  The AEDPA’s one-year deadline in which state prisoners 
may file federal habeas petitions is not a per se violation of the Suspension Clause
because the limitation is not jurisdictional and may be subject to equitable tolling.  Green 
v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Lucidore v. N.Y. State Div. of
Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)).  Therefore, the time restriction does not per se 
render the remedy of habeas corpus inadequate or ineffective. Id. at 1004. 
73. Section 2244(d)(1) provides:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.  The 
limitation period shall run from the latest of— 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized 
by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 
74. See id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).  An application for postconviction relief is pending 
from the time it is first filed in the trial court until it is eventually dismissed and further 
appellate review is unavailable under the particular state’s procedures.  Currie v.
Matesanz, 281 F.3d 261, 266 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the application is pending not 
just during the time it is being considered by the trial or appellate court but also during 
the gap between each court’s resolution and the petitioner’s timely filing of a request for 
review at the next level).  If a petitioner stops the appeal process before reaching the 
state court of last resort, the conviction becomes final, and the AEDPA’s one-year statute 
of limitations for federal habeas relief begins to run.  Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 
694 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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review,76 the federal circuit courts and the United States Supreme Court
continue to debate the application of this tolling.77 
Congress has received both criticism and support since enacting the 
AEDPA in 1996.  Congress passed the statute on April 24, 1996, due to 
pressure to reform habeas corpus law after a federal court convicted and 
sentenced to death the perpetrator of the 1995 Oklahoma City Federal 
Building bombing.78  Commentators criticized lawmakers for using the
tragedy as justification for the aggressive restrictions on the remedy of 
habeas corpus review.79  Critics claim it “reflected a passion-fueled,
extreme, and not well thought-out form of habeas corpus bashing.”80  On
the other hand, defenders of the bill insist that Congress enacted the 
AEDPA to eliminate unfounded and abusive delays in the federal habeas 
76. See id. § 2244(d)(2). 
77. See generally 23 JOHN H. BLUME ET AL., HABEAS ASSISTANCE & TRAINING 
PROJECT, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS UPDATE § II(A)(8), at 286–306 (2011), available at
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/Habeas%20Update%2023.pdf.  The Federal Habeas 
Corpus Update “serve[s] as a guide to various procedural trends and issues commonly
arising in federal habeas corpus cases, and . . . provide[s] . . . information regarding 
developments arising from the [AEDPA],” including a listing of current AEDPA cases 
by topic.  Id. intro.
78. See Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need for Equitable Tolling of the 
Habeas Corpus Statute of Limitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (2004); see also James S.
Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 
67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 413 (2001) (“AEDPA . . . was the product of the bizarre
alignment of three ill-starred events: Timothy McVeigh’s twisted patriotism and disdain
for ‘collateral damage,’ the Gingrich Revolution in its heyday, and the Clinton
Presidency at the furthest point of its most rightward triangulation.”).  Congress enacted
the AEDPA as a result of “increased pressure on Congress and the President, during an 
election year, to do whatever was necessary to prevent Timothy McVeigh, the convicted 
bomber [of the Oklahoma City Federal Building], from delaying or escaping execution”
by filing numerous habeas petitions.  Erik Degrate, I’m Innocent: Can a California
Innocence Project Help Exonerate Me? . . . Not if the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) Has Its Way, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 77–78 (2006).  To some 
extent the AEDPA accomplished this goal because Timothy McVeigh was the first
federal death row prisoner to be executed since 1963. Id. at 78. 
79. See Angela Ellis, Note, “Is Innocence Irrelevant” to AEDPA’s Statute of 
Limitations? Avoiding a Miscarriage of Justice in Federal Habeas Corpus, 56 VILL. L. 
REV. 129, 147 n.116 (2011) (“Shame on those who invoke the names of innocents
slaughtered in Oklahoma City . . . in their quest to effectively abolish the writ of habeas 
corpus.” (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 7965 (1996) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman));
see also 141 CONG. REC. 15,031 (1995) (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold) 
(condemning the reform provisions as political opportunism and expressing concern that 
the new procedures would lead to executions and imprisonment of innocent people). 
80. See Ellis, supra note 79, at 147 n.116 (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Foreword to RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE 










   
 
    
 
   
 
 
   
   
 




   
review process.81 The Supreme Court has also explained that the primary 
purpose of the AEDPA is to ensure the finality of state court judgments 
by creating procedural barriers to federal review of those judgments.82 
III. EQUITY VS. ADMINISTRATION 
A.  Statute of Limitations 
Statutes of limitations create a bright-line rule that prohibits claims 
after a certain date, which provides certainty to the parties and ensures
structure for the courts.  Generally, federal courts have justified statutes 
of limitations as serving three main purposes—“providing fairness to the
defendant, promoting efficiency, and ensuring institutional legitimacy.”83 
First, a petitioner’s claims, even those that are meritorious, must be cut 
off at some point to provide repose for the defendant.84  Additionally, 
statutes of limitations promote accuracy of the evidence, as plaintiffs
must bring forth their claims within a reasonable time frame so as to 
ensure that evidence is accessible, memories are not forgotten, and 
81. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (“[T]he bill is designed to reduce 
the abuse of habeas corpus that results from delayed and repetitive filings.”); see also
David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 346 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111
(1996)).  Additionally, “[f]airness, finality, and federalism are considered the touchstone
principles that guide and shape habeas jurisprudence.”  Bradley, supra note 46, at 483 
(citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 697 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).  Prior to the AEDPA’s procedural changes, a state defendant 
convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death “could take advantage of three 
successive procedures to challenge constitutional defects in his or her conviction or 
sentence.”  Krystal M. Moore, Comment, Is Saving an Innocent Man a “Fool’s
Errand”? The Limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act on an 
Original Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 197, 204 (2011) 
(quoting CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF 
LEGAL OVERVIEW 1, 11 (2006)).  As a consequence, victims were not able to receive 
justice, as “there were extensive delays between sentenc[ing] and execution of sentence.” 
DOYLE, supra, at 11. 
82. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (“[The AEDPA’s purpose is] to
limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the 
States’ interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings.”); see also
supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
83. Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context 
of Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 74–75 (2005). 
84. See id. at 75 (citing Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002)) (providing
that statutes of limitations protect the defendant’s “expectations that he will not be held 
accountable for misconduct after a certain period of time has elapsed”); see also Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1980) (protecting defendants from claims 
arising out of actions “long past”).  Statutes of limitations are intended to promote 
fairness by “‘protect[ing] individuals from having to defend themselves against charges 
when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time’ and by
providing for repose.”  Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45
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witnesses are available.85  Furthermore, statutes of limitations reduce the 
number of frivolous or meritless claims.86  In turn, by reducing the 
number of undesirable filings in the court system, a statutory deadline 
helps alleviate the growing dockets of federal courts.87 
Nevertheless, such a strict statutory deadline can lead to unfairness.  If 
a petitioner files a claim even one day past the statute of limitations 
period, the court must dismiss the petition, thus depriving the petitioner 
of the right to be heard.88  Such a deprivation “undermines [the] fundamental
notions of fairness and due process that form the cornerstone of the legal
system.”89  An even greater injustice occurs when a petitioner with a
meritorious claim, such as a claim of actual innocence, is denied relief
solely because of a harsh statutory deadline.90 
Neither Congress nor the courts had ever imposed strict time constraints
on filing federal habeas corpus petitions prior to the enactment of the 
AEDPA in 1996.91  Even in the mid-twentieth century, when the scope
85. See Malveaux, supra note 83, at 76; see also United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 
260 U.S. 290, 299 (1922) (“[Statutes of limitations] supply the place of evidence lost or 
impaired by lapse of time by raising a presumption which renders proof unnecessary.”);
David, 318 F.3d at 347 (“There is a strong public interest in the prompt assertion of
habeas claims.”).  Avoiding deterioration of evidence serves several purposes: “(a) to 
ensure accuracy in fact-finding; (b) to prevent the assertion of fraudulent claims; (c) to 
reduce the cost of litigation; and (d) to preserve the integrity of the legal system.”  Tyler 
T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28
PAC. L.J. 453, 471 (1997). 
86. Malveaux, supra note 83, at 80 (citing Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 85, at 
495–97).  Limitation periods are intended to reduce the number of cases filed in general 
and to reduce the number of meritless or unwarranted cases in particular.  Ochoa & 
Wistrich, supra note 85, at 495–500. 
87. See, e.g., Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 542–43 (1989) (balancing the 
interests in disposing of litigation as quickly as possible and allowing claims to be heard 
on the merits); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (explaining 
that statutes of limitations promote efficiency by limiting docket burdens by “spar[ing] 
the courts from litigation of stale claims”); Davila v. Mumford, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 214, 
223 (1860) (noting that one goal of statute of limitations is “preventing litigation”).
88. See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental 
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).  Additionally, providing
litigants a day in court “promotes the dignitary value of the legal process.”  Ochoa &
Wistrich, supra note 85, at 501. 
89. Malveaux, supra note 83, at 82. 
90. Id. at 83; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“If the
underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of
relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.”). 
91. The history of habeas corpus goes at least as far back as the early days of 
English common law, during which the doctrine of habeas corpus was never subject to a 
statute of limitations.  See Sessions, supra note 46, at 1514.  This continued throughout
1303
 





   
   







      
    
 
 









of habeas review over state convictions drastically expanded and habeas 
corpus petitions inundated the federal judiciary,92 the writ of habeas 
corpus remained free of time constraints.93 Although Congress attempted to
place time limits on habeas corpus petitions in previous legislative 
sessions,94 none of the proposed bills ever passed.95  Prior to the AEDPA,
habeas corpus statutes required only that petitioners file their applications
for habeas corpus relief without prejudicial delay.96  Shortly before the 
AEDPA’s enactment in 1996, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner 
the development of habeas corpus jurisprudence in the nineteenth century, when 
prisoners had the right to file habeas petitions in federal court without the restriction of a 
limitations period.  See Bradley, supra note 46, at 465, 465 n.20 (quoting Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867)).  Specifically, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 
states, in relevant part, that “the several courts of the United States . . . shall have power 
to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or 
her liberty in violation of the constitution . . . .” Ch. 28, 14 Stat. at 385.
92. Aaron G. McCollough, Note, For Whom the Court Tolls: Equitable Tolling of
the AEDPA Statute of Limitations in Capital Habeas Cases, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
365, 371 (2005) (citing Max Rosenn, The Great Writ—A Reflection of Societal Change, 
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 343–44 (1983)).  For example, federal courts could review factual 
disputes de novo in habeas corpus proceedings. Id. (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 
293, 312 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992)). 
Furthermore, the Warren Court held that the exhaustion doctrine, which applied to direct 
appeals in state court, did not apply to state collateral proceedings.  Id. (citing Fay v. 
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398–99 (1963), overruled by Keeney, 504 U.S. at 1). 
93. The Supreme Court held that habeas corpus provides a remedy “without limit 
of time.”  Sessions, supra note 46, at 1533 (quoting United States v. Smith, 331 U.S.
469, 475 (1947)).
94. See Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality
of the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State 
Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451, 452 n.2 (1990–1991)
(detailing a number of congressional bills proposing time limits on habeas corpus 
petitions); see also Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 
2350–76, 2416–23 (1993) (reviewing congressional debates and proposals concerning
statutory limitations on habeas corpus law). 
95. See Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence”
Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343,
356–57 (2002) (citing Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1578–83 (11th Cir. 1996)) 
(providing an overview of  “the numerous proposed reform bills that eventually led to
the enactment of the AEDPA”).
96. Before the enactment of the AEDPA in 1996, courts had discretion to dismiss a 
habeas corpus petition as untimely, but only if it appeared that the state had been 
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition because of the petitioner’s delay in
filing. See Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426, § 2(7)–(8), 90 Stat. 1334, 1335
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 app. at R. 9(a) (2000)); see also Lonchar v. Thomas,
517 U.S. 314, 316 (1996) (holding that pre-AEDPA, a first federal habeas corpus
petition was governed by Rule 9 of Habeas Corpus Rules rather than generalized 
equitable considerations and Rule 9 provides the only form of “time limitation” for first 
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could even file his initial habeas corpus petition on the day of his scheduled 
execution.97 
However, in enacting the AEDPA in 1996, Congress implemented a 
one-year statute of limitations period for state prisoners to file federal
habeas corpus petitions.98  This limitations period was justified according to
the cornerstone principles of habeas corpus jurisprudence—finality, 
comity, and federalism.99 Nevertheless, the statute of limitations should 
not be a hindrance to the fundamental purpose of habeas corpus—to 
correct miscarriages of justice.100  The very nature of the writ of habeas
corpus “demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility
essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced 
and corrected.”101 
97. Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 316–17. Nine years after being sentenced to death for 
murder, Lonchar filed his first federal habeas corpus petition the day of his scheduled 
execution.  Id. The Court held that a first federal habeas corpus petition should not be
dismissed because of “special ad hoc ‘equitable’ reasons not encompassed within the 
framework of Rule 9[(a) of the Habeas Corpus Rules].”  Id. at 322.  The Court reasoned
that dismissal of a first federal habeas petition “denies the petitioner the protections of
the Great Writ entirely.”  Id. at 324.  The Court also recognized that first petitions
generally pose less threat to the state’s interest in finality and are more likely to lead to
the discovery of unconstitutional convictions.  Id.
98. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 101, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006)) (governing state
prisoners’ petitions); id. § 105 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006)) (governing federal 
prisoners’ petitions).  Both provisions impose a one-year time limit.
99. See Bradley, supra note 46, at 483 (citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 
697 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  Statutes of 
limitations, which apply to both civil and criminal actions, are designed to “provid[e] 
finality and predictability in legal affairs” and “ensur[e] that claims will be resolved 
while evidence is reasonably available and fresh.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th 
ed. 2009).  In other words, because evidence may become lost or facts may become
vague or unclear due to the passage of time and the loss of memory, death, or
disappearance of witnesses, a statute of limitations period helps prevent those fraudulent 
and stale claims from arising. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
100. See Schlup v. Delo, 514 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (stating that concern about the 
injustice of convicting innocent persons is at the core of our criminal justice system); see 
also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (reiterating the 
importance of avoiding wrongful convictions). 
101. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969).  Additionally, in a 5–4 decision, 
Justice Fortas wrote:
There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the 
careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, for 
it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or
evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that he is deprived 
of his freedom contrary to law. 































   
 
  






B.  Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations
Once the statute of limitations on a cause of action expires, a petitioner
may no longer initiate a legal proceeding.102  However, the doctrine of 
equitable tolling permits a court to exclude a certain period of time that 
would otherwise count against the limitations period103 when, for reasons of
fundamental fairness, it would be unjust to strictly apply the statute of
limitations.104  Courts may equitably toll a statute of limitations when, 
despite due diligence, some external factor prevents a party from meeting 
the strict statutory deadline.105  Courts generally will equitably toll a statute
of limitations when the defendant presents “extraordinary circumstances”106 
beyond the defendant’s control or external to the defendant’s own conduct
that make it impossible to file a petition on time.107  Federal courts have
102. See  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a statute of
limitations as a federal or state law that restricts the time within which legal proceedings 
may be brought). 
103. Equitable tolling is a remedy in which courts have discretion to allow a 
petitioner to assert a claim after the statutory limitations period has expired.  See Nara v. 
Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that courts have used their 
discretion to equitably toll the AEDPA’s statute of limitations when a habeas petitioner
“has been unfairly prevented from asserting his rights in a timely fashion”); Fisher v.
Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A court can allow an untimely petition to 
proceed under the doctrine of equitable tolling . . . .”).
104. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (explaining the 
purpose of equitable tolling); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(“[E]quity must be reserved for those rare instances where . . . it would be unconscionable to
enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.”).
105. See David D. Doran, Comment, Equitable Tolling of Statutory Benefit Time 
Limitations: A Congressional Intent Analysis, 64 WASH. L. REV. 681, 682–83 (1989) 
(describing generally the requirements of equitable tolling); see also Trapp v. Spencer, 
479 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that it is the litigant’s reason for the late filing
that the court scrutinizes in determining whether a prisoner was unfairly prevented from 
filing a timely habeas petition); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (explaining the requirements for equitable tolling). 
106. Although there is no bright-line rule for what constitutes extraordinary
circumstances, courts have generally required that they be situations that are beyond the
prisoner’s control.  See Fisher, 174 F.3d at 713 (“[E]quitable tolling does not lend itself 
to bright-line rules.”); see also Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d 95, 101 (1st
Cir. 2008) (“[P]etitioners carry the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary circumstances 
beyond their control ‘prevented timely filing . . . .’” (quoting Trenkler v. United States, 
268 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2001))); Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1319 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)) (articulating that
courts require more than extraordinary circumstances; the circumstances must also be
beyond the petitioner’s control); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 
1998) (en banc)).
107. In other words, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows 
“‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”  Lawrence v. Florida, 549 
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exercised their power to apply equitable tolling to extend the AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations period for numerous reasons, including improper 
dismissal of a defendant’s habeas petition,108 the defendant’s mental 
incompetence or incapacity,109 the defendant’s showing of actual
innocence,110 and misconduct or concealment of evidence by state
officials.111  The petitioner must additionally show diligence in pursuing 
(articulating this rule but not yet deciding whether equitable tolling was applicable to the
AEDPA’s statute of limitations).  Federal courts have applied this rule of equitable 
tolling to extend the one-year statute of limitations period for prisoners seeking federal 
review of their state convictions since the late 1990s.  See Marni von Wilpert, Comment, 
Holland v. Florida: A Prisoner’s Last Chance, Attorney Error, and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act’s One-Year Statute of Limitations Period for Federal 
Habeas Corpus Review, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429, 1440 n.64 (2010) (citing examples 
of district court and circuit court of appeals cases using equitable tolling to excuse the 
petitioner’s failure to comply with the strict statute of limitations set forth by the
AEDPA).  The Supreme Court ultimately reaffirmed this rule in Holland v. Florida, 
holding that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling.  130 S. Ct.
2549, 2562 (2010). 
108. See, e.g., Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 
equitable tolling when the district court improperly dismissed and then lost the petitioner’s 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 motion). 
109. See, e.g., Ata v. Scutt, 662 F.3d 736, 741–42 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e now hold 
that a petitioner’s mental incompetence, which prevents the timely filing of a habeas
petition, is an extraordinary circumstance that may equitably toll AEDPA’s one-year
statute of limitations.”); Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2010); Laws 
v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). 
110. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Miller v.
Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998)) (stating that equitable tolling would be
appropriate if a defendant is actually innocent).  There is a distinction between the
miscarriage of justice exception and claims based on pure innocence of fact.  See Herrera 
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (“[T]he existence merely of newly discovered 
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal
habeas corpus.” (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), overruled by
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992))).  On the other hand, the actual innocence 
gateway established in Schlup v. Delo is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a
gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred
constitutional claim considered on the merits.” 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995) (quoting 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404). 
111. Courts have allowed equitable tolling in AEDPA litigation when state officials 
misled prisoners about the habeas petition process, and thus the reasons for the untimely
filings were beyond the prisoners’ control.  See, e.g., Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 
1246 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a court misled the prisoner about the filing 
deadline, the prisoner’s subsequent late filing was “not his fault”); Roy v. Lampert, 465 
F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that equitable tolling would be warranted because
deficiencies in a prison library prevented a diligent pro se prisoner from learning about
the limitations period); Prieto v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 511, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2006)
(applying equitable tolling because the petitioner detrimentally relied on a misleading 

































   
 
 
federal habeas relief, which requires demonstrating “a causal relationship
between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable
tolling rests and the lateness of [the] filing.”112 
Before Congress passed the AEDPA in 1996, the Supreme Court had 
consistently held that federal courts had equitable discretion to hear the 
merits of procedurally defaulted habeas claims when the failure to do so 
would “result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”113  Ultimately, in
2010, the Supreme Court in Holland v. Florida formally decided that the 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling.114  The  
Court held that because the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations set
forth in § 2244(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, it is “subject to a ‘rebuttable 
presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’”115  The Court then explained 
that there are two reasons the presumption applies with particular force
to the AEDPA.  First, “‘equitable principles’ have traditionally ‘governed’ 
the substantive law of habeas corpus,”116 and federal courts will “not
Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 710, 712 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that equitable
tolling was warranted when a state court failed to inform a prisoner about the disposition
of his case); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying equitable 
tolling when a prisoner was denied access to his legal files).
112. Virginia E. Harper-Ho, Tolling of the AEDPA Statute of Limitations: Bennett,
Walker, and the Equitable Last Resort, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 2, ¶ 27 (2001) (quoting
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“We have generally been much less forgiving 
in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving
his legal rights.”); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[Equity does
not require tolling] absent a showing that [the petitioner] diligently pursued his 
application the remainder of the time [between the extraordinary circumstance and the 
filing deadline] and still could not complete it on time.”).
113. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also, e.g., Schlup, 513 
U.S. at 320–21; Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1992); McCleskey v. Zant, 
499 U.S. 467, 494–95 (1991); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 414 (1989) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
114. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).  In discussing what would
constitute an extraordinary circumstance, the Supreme Court in Holland reiterated its 
conclusion from an earlier case that a “‘garden variety claim of excusable neglect,’ such 
as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline,” does not
warrant equitable tolling.”  Id. at 2564 (quoting Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336
(2007); Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96).  Nevertheless, even in the absence of an allegation of 
“‘bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth on the lawyer’s 
part’ . . . unprofessional attorney conduct may, in certain circumstances, prove ‘egregious’ 
and can be ‘extraordinary.’”  Id. at 2563–64 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 
1339 (2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2549). 
115. Id. at 2560 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96).  The Supreme Court explained
that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations defense is “not ‘jurisdictional’” because it does
not “set forth ‘an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever’ its ‘clock has run.’” Id.
(quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205, 208 (2006)). 
116. Id. (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)); see also Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (describing habeas corpus as governed by equitable principles), 
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construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional equitable authority absent
the ‘clearest command.’”117  Second, the Court asserted that Congress must
have realized that courts would apply the presumption when interpreting
the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations because Congress enacted
the AEDPA when case law had long established the presumption in 
favor of equitable tolling.118 Therefore, despite the silence of § 2244(d)
as to an equitable exception and its express provision for statutory
tolling, the Supreme Court held that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
is subject to equitable tolling.119 
Nevertheless, federal courts remain reluctant to consider a petition 
for habeas relief after the one-year limitations period has expired.120 
Additionally, petitioners have struggled to establish extraordinary
circumstances to demonstrate that the petition is otherwise timely.  For
example, “a petitioner’s ignorance of the law, lack of legal training or
representation, incapacitating illness, illiteracy, and counsel’s error in 
failing to timely file have all been deemed insufficient to justify equitable
tolling of [the AEDPA’s statute of limitations].”121  Therefore, although 
Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 573 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[H]abeas corpus is 
certainly to be governed by the rules of fairness enforced in equity.”).
117. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000)).
118. Id. at 2561.  The presumption of equitable tolling is reinforced by the fact that 
Congress enacted the AEDPA after the Supreme Court decided Irwin v. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, in which the Court held a nonjurisdictional federal statute 
of limitations is subject to equitable tolling, and thus Congress was likely aware that 
courts would apply the presumption when interpreting the AEDPA’s limitations 
provisions.  Id. at 95–96. 
119. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2561–62; see also Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 
53 (2002) (rejecting a claim that an “express tolling provision, appearing in the same
subsection as the [limitations] period” demonstrated “statutory intent not to toll the 
[limitations] period”). 
120. See Brandon Segal, Comment, Habeas Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and AEDPA’s
Statute of Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo Gateway Standard for Claims of Actual 
Innocence Fails To Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully Convicted Americans, 31 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 225, 233 (2008); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (“[D]istrict judges will take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the 
federal habeas process, and will only authorize extensions when this high hurdle is 
surmounted.”), overruled on other grounds by 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 121. Sussman, supra note 95, at 362–63 (footnotes omitted) (citing to situations in
which federal courts refused to apply equitable tolling to extend the statute of limitations 
period set forth in the AEDPA); see also Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1325 (11th
Cir. 2008) (holding that mere attorney negligence, in which an attorney miscalculates the 
limitations period, misinterprets the statute, or misunderstands the AEDPA’s procedural 
requirements, does not justify equitable tolling); Smith v. Suthers, 18 F. App’x 727, 728– 
29 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding the district court’s ruling that illiteracy alone does not 































   
 
 
the Supreme Court held that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to
equitable tolling, the instances where this actually occurs are few and far
between.
IV. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO WHETHER AN ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE EXCEPTION IS NECESSARY
A.  Whether an Actual Innocence Exception Matters 
One might wonder whether an actual innocence exception is necessary. 
Criminal defendants already have a number of constitutional rights and
safeguards designed to ensure juries convict only guilty criminals.122 
For example, due process in criminal cases requires a “fair trial in a fair 
tribunal.”123  Criminal defendants are entitled to a presumption of innocence
and the prosecutor must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt to sustain a conviction.124  Furthermore, criminal defendants have
(stating that mere ignorance of the law or lack of knowledge of filing deadlines does not 
justify equitable tolling); United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that pro se status, illiteracy, deafness, and lack of legal training are not external
factors excusing abuse of the writ); Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 932 F.2d 473, 
478 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply equitable tolling where the delay in filing was the 
result of petitioner’s unfamiliarity with the legal process or his lack of legal 
representation); Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp. 2d 160, 168, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(holding that the petitioner’s allegations of AIDS-related physical and mental impairments
during the one-year period in which he could file his federal habeas petition were
insufficient to establish extraordinary circumstances).  But see Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 
2563–64 (distinguishing “garden variety claim[s] of excusable neglect” from claims of
professional misconduct that amount to egregious attorney behavior, which the Court
held could constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting the use of equitable 
tolling (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96)).
122. Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution, the government may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
123. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that not only is a biased 
decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but “even the probability of unfairness” 
should be prevented); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (holding 
that the principle providing that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process applies to administrative agencies that adjudicate as well as to courts).
124. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).  The Supreme Court 
described the presumption of the innocence of a criminal defendant as an “‘assumption’ 
[of innocence] that is indulged in the absence of contrary evidence.”  Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978) (quoting Carr v. State, 4 So. 2d 887, 888 (Miss.
1941)); see also  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1306 (9th ed. 2009) ([“The presumption of
innocence is t]he fundamental principle that a person may not be convicted of a crime
unless the government proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without any burden 
placed on the accused to prove innocence.”).  The prosecutor has the burden to prove the 
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a right to jury trial125 and to assistance of counsel.126  Additionally, criminal
defendants have the right to challenge their convictions through one or 
more appeals, state habeas corpus petitions, or federal habeas corpus 
petitions.127 
Nevertheless, the judicial system is admittedly imperfect, and despite 
these safeguards, innocent defendants are still wrongly convicted due to 
failures within the legal system.128  For example, although every indigent
capital defendant is entitled to appointed counsel during federal habeas 
procedures,129 a tremendous discrepancy exists among state public defender
services.130  The majority of indigent defense systems labor under excessive
any doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, or if they do, their doubts are unreasonable.  See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
125. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because we believe that trial
by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which— 
were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
126. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (deciding that the right to 
assistance of counsel is “fundamental” and that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the 
right constitutionally required in state courts); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))). 
127. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
128. Although it is impossible to assess how many people are in jail for crimes they
did not commit, 142 inmates have been released from death row since 1973 because of 
evidence of their innocence.  Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Innocence-list-those-freed-
death-row (last updated Jan. 4, 2013) (estimating the average number of years between
being sentenced to death and exoneration to be 9.8 years).  DNA testing has also resulted 
in the postconviction exoneration of more than 300 people in the United States. 
Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject. 
org/know/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).  As former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor admitted, “If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing 
some innocent defendants to be executed.”  Editorial, Justice O’Connor on Executions, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006) (stating that impoverished defendants 
seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence are entitled to counsel during federal 
habeas proceedings). 
130. For example, after establishing the first public defender office in 1914, 
California has consistently been looked upon as a leader in providing indigent defense 
services. History of the Office, L.A. COUNTY PUB. DEFENDER, http://pd.co.la.ca.us/About 
_history.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).  The Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office, 
with a program that uses both staff attorneys and appointments to attorneys in private 
practice, has also been used as a model for other states.  See About the SPD: History of 
the State Public Defender’s Office, WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFF., http://www.wisspd.
























   













caseloads and lack sufficient support services, thus preventing public 
defenders from providing adequate representation.131 Furthermore,
habeas procedural requirements are often so complicated that even 
postconviction litigators can have difficulties understanding and meeting
the requirements.132  Procedural error during postconviction proceedings
is especially dangerous because the AEDPA’s one-year limitations 
period continues to run and can expire while defendants await the resolution 
of their improper state claims, before even attempting to file federal
der (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (including in the history of public defender the fact that
Wisconsin’s public defender program has been used as a model for other states).  On the
other hand, the public defender systems in states like Alabama and Texas fail to protect 
citizens’ constitutional rights.  Alabama underpays appointed capital counsel and sets 
low eligibility requirements, requiring only five years of experience in criminal cases. 
See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012) (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING 
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE ALABAMA DEATH 
PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 117–20, 124–29 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (2006))
(noting that appointed counsel in death penalty cases are undercompensated).  Texas, 
which has the third largest number of death row inmates per state and has had 491 
executions since 1976, does not even have a public defender system for indigent 
defendants.  See Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last updated Oct. 
1, 2012); Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976 
(last updated Dec. 12, 2012).  Instead, the state relies on court-appointed lawyers who 
may lack experience with capital murder defenses or appeals. See Brent Newton, 
Capital Punishment: Texas Could Learn a Lot from Florida, TEX. LAW., Feb. 26, 1996, 
at 31.
131. See Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors That 
Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 
269 (2009). 
132. See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Even with the 
benefit of legal training, ready access to legal materials and the aid of four years of 
additional case law, an informed calculation of [the prisoner’s] tolling period evaded
both his appointed counsel and the expertise of a federal magistrate judge.”).  Criminal 
defendants, if desired, may represent themselves in habeas corpus litigation.  See, e.g.,
Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 918 (noting that prisoners may proceed in habeas litigation pro se
because Alabama does not guarantee representation to indigent capital defendants in 
postconviction proceedings); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1989) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Virginia’s practice of allowing death row inmates to 
prepare postconviction petitions pro se).  However, counsel is nevertheless encouraged 
during habeas proceedings because pro se petitioners can have even greater difficulty
navigating the complex habeas corpus procedures than postconviction litigators.  See
Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to 
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 354 (2006) (noting
that proceeding pro se in habeas litigation is unreasonable because postconviction
procedures usually involve strict fact-specific pleading standards, complex exhaustion 
requirements, and technical consequences that require a highly competent and skilled 
attorney); see also Mello & Duffy, supra note 94, at 481–84 (explaining that many
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habeas petitions.133  Without an actual innocence gateway, courts would
dismiss a federal habeas petition filed even one day after the one-year 
statute of limitations, regardless of the strength of the actual innocence
showing.134  This is particularly troubling because it forecloses any further 
judicial review for innocent petitioners.135 
As such, commentators argue that the AEDPA’s one-year statute of 
limitations period is an insufficient length of time for criminal defendants to
file a federal habeas corpus petition because such a limited period may
not provide enough time for a petitioner to first exhaust all state 
remedies.136  Petitioners may use all or most of the one-year time period 
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).  Even worse, procedural error may
be fatal for criminal defendants in states with capital punishment. See Samuel R. Gross,
The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 
BUFF. L. REV. 469, 474 (1996) (exploring reasons why errors are more likely in capital 
cases than in other criminal matters).
134. See generally Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (explaining the actual innocence 
gateway). 
135. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996).  This is not to say,
however, that a petitioner may not raise his actual innocence claim in a different forum. 
A petitioner may file a request for executive clemency, in which the President or a
governor has the power to pardon the criminal.  See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 415 (1993) (stating that throughout American history, “[e]xecutive clemency has 
provided the ‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice system” by providing a mechanism for 
granting relief to prisoners who demonstrate their actual innocence (quoting KATHLEEN 
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 131 (1989)).  
Nevertheless, scholars have criticized clemency as an ineffective remedy.  See, e.g., 
Austin Sarat, Memorializing Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions in the Killing 
State, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 183, 186 n.8 (2008) (“[Rare use of clemency] represents a 
radical shift from several decades ago, when governors granted clemency in 20 to 25 
percent of the death penalty cases they reviewed.” (citing AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON 
TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION app. B (2005)). 
136. For instance, commentator Limin Zheng offers a compelling analysis of why
actual innocence is necessary as a gateway to habeas review: 
One year is insufficient time for a confined inmate to prepare and file a
meaningful habeas corpus petition that would escape the fatal traps of the
exhaustion doctrine, the procedural-default doctrine, and the second and successive
petitions doctrines.  Many inmates are uneducated, mentally impaired, or 
both. . . . 
. . . [Even if a prisoner is educated or receives assistance of counsel, 
reinvestigation is crucial] where the claims must rely on new evidence. . . .
[F]ew inmates have access to the outside resources necessary to engage in 
further factfinding [for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial 
misconduct]. . . . 
. . . [And m]ost of these attorneys [who assist in investigation] represent 
prisoners on a pro bono basis.
See Zheng, supra note 47, at 2129–30 (footnotes omitted); see also Diane E. Courselle, 






   
  





























investigating new evidence and drafting their postconviction petitions.137 
Furthermore, because the statute of limitations continues to run after
each final judgment,138 petitioners typically do not have enough time
remaining after exhausting state remedies to seek certiorari from the United 
States Supreme Court.139  As a result, courts are likely to deny petitioners
their last opportunity to remedy a wrongful conviction.  Therefore, an
actual innocence exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is
essential to ensure that courts provide an effective legal avenue of relief 
to the wrongfully convicted.140 
B.  Split Among the Circuits 
Prisoners who would otherwise be time-barred from filing habeas 
petitions possess the option to seek equitable tolling of their limitations 
period.141  However, establishing the requisite extraordinary circumstances
to justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s limitations period can be
quite challenging for prisoners.142  Over the last decade, federal circuit 
courts have started to recognize an actual innocence exception as an
alternative ground for equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of
limitations.143 
Asked To Review a Judgment from a State Post-Conviction Proceeding?, 53 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 585, 587–88 (2005–2006) (stating that petitioners face numerous difficulties when
attempting to understand the AEDPA’s tolling provisions, especially regarding the task
of exhausting of state remedies). 
137. See Courselle, supra note 136, at 588; see also, e.g., Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d
577, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2005) (barring the petition because it was filed three days after the 
one-year limitation following discovery of new evidence); Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d
587, 589 (7th Cir. 2004) (barring the petition because the court found that the police
investigation of another suspect was not a new factual predicate for purposes of tolling). 
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 
139. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332, 337 (2007) (holding that 
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a certiorari
petition in the Supreme Court and, even assuming equitable tolling were available, the
petitioner failed to make a showing of extraordinary circumstances necessary for tolling). 
140. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 46, at 468–70. 
141. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010); see supra notes 103–11 and
accompanying text.
142. See Segal, supra note 120, at 233; see also supra note 121 and accompanying
text.
143. Four circuits have expressly recognized that actual innocence is a valid 
argument for equitable tolling of time-barred habeas petitions.  Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 
929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 158; Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 
2010); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 602 (6th Cir. 2005).  Four other circuits have 
refused to decide the issue, finding that the petitioner would not have met the burden of 
proof of actual innocence in that specific case but not reaching whether the statute of 
limitations is entitled to equitable tolling.  See Horning v. Lavan, 197 F. App’x 90, 94
(3d Cir. 2006); Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 174 (2d Cir. 2004); Flanders v. Graves, 
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Until August 2011, the majority of circuit courts that considered this 
question declined to recognize an actual innocence exception.144  However, 
the recent en banc decision in Lee v. Lampert, holding that a credible claim 
of actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to the AEDPA’s 
one-year statute of limitations, tipped the scale in favor of recognizing 
the exception.145  Nevertheless, the federal circuit courts remain divided 
on whether actual innocence is grounds for equitable tolling of the 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations period.
1. No Equitable Exception of Actual Innocence to the 
AEDPA’s Limitations Period 
The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have long held that an actual
innocence exception does not apply under any circumstances to the 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.146  The First Circuit explained
that because the same statutory or judicial deadlines apply to both 
defendants who may be innocent and defendants against whom the evidence
is overwhelming, defendants must adhere to the time constraints for 
pretrial motions, appeals, and habeas claims, regardless of the evidence.147 
The court also found that the actual innocence exception explicitly 
conflicts with the AEDPA.148  In rejecting an actual innocence exception, 
45641, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2007) (stating that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has not held that actual innocence is a ground for equitable tolling of the 
AEDPA’s limitations period), appeal dismissed, 225 F. App’x 108 (4th Cir. 2007). 
Three circuits have expressly rejected equitable tolling of time-barred habeas petitions 
for actual innocence claims.  See Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 
2005); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347–48 (1st Cir. 2003); Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d
843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002). 
144. See, e.g., Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 653 F.3d
929; Escamilla, 426 F.3d at 872; David, 318 F.3d at 347–48; Cousin, 310 F.3d at 849. 
145. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 945. 
146. The Fifth Circuit has continuously held that a petitioner’s claims of actual 
innocence do not justify equitable tolling of the limitations period.  See Cousin, 310 F.3d
at 849; see also Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000).  The First Circuit 
held that the dicta in cases that have inferred that actual innocence might override the
one-year limit is in tension with the statute and is not persuasive.  See David, 318 F.3d at 
347.  In addition, Seventh Circuit cases generally support the notion that the circuit does 
not recognize an actual innocence exception under any circumstances.  See Escamilla, 
426 F.3d at 871–72. 
147. David, 318 F.3d at 347. 
148. Id. The First Circuit acknowledged that Congress adopted an actual innocence 
test as part of the AEDPA’s requirements for allowing second or successive habeas
petitions.  Id. at 347 n.5.  Congress also provided, however, that the second habeas 

















   










the First Circuit stressed the public interest in the prompt assertion of
habeas claims due to fading memory, disappearance of witnesses, and
dispersion of evidence.149 
Because the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not contain
an exemption for petitioners claiming actual innocence of the crimes for 
which they have been convicted, the Fifth Circuit explained that a 
petitioner’s claim of actual innocence is only “relevant to the timeliness 
of his petition if [the claims] justify equitable tolling of the limitations 
period.”150  The court held that a petitioner’s claims of actual innocence
do not preclude the dismissal of the petition as untimely.151  Similarly, 
the Seventh Circuit stated that actual innocence does not relate to the 
statutory timeliness rules,152 and “although the statute leaves some . . . 
room for equitable tolling, courts cannot alter the rules laid down in the 
text.”153  The court explained that unless a prisoner meets the AEDPA’s
standard for new evidence, the petitioner’s contention that new factual
discoveries amount to actual innocence is unavailing.154 
2. Recognizing a Credible Claim of Actual Innocence as an 
Exception to the AEDPA’s Limitations Period 
In contrast, in its recent en banc decision in Lee v. Lampert, the Ninth 
Circuit held that where an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner
demonstrates that it is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror
could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.”  Id.; 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).  Therefore, the First Circuit found that the 
one-year limitations period on filing initial habeas petitions is not alleviated by any 
statutory exception for actual innocence. David, 318 F.3d at 347. 
149. David, 318 F.3d at 347; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
150. Cousin, 310 F.3d at 849. 
151. Id.; see also Felder, 204 F.3d at 171. 
152. Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2005) (“‘Actual
innocence’ permits a second petition under § 2244(b)(2)(B)—it clears away a claim that
the prisoner defaulted in state court or by omission from the first federal petition—but 
does not extend the time to seek collateral relief.”). 
153. Id. at 872 (citation omitted); see also Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359
(2005) (holding that a second or successive petition must meet the AEDPA’s timeliness 
requirements even if time runs out before a given avenue becomes legally and factually
available to challenge a conviction or sentence). 
154. Escamilla, 426 F.3d at 872 (“Actual innocence without a newly discovered 
claim does nothing at all.”).  Under the AEDPA, a second petition is only possible if the
factual predicate could not have been discovered earlier, and the defendant shows actual 
innocence by clear and convincing evidence.  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)(B) 
(2006).  The AEDPA’s required standard of proof for claims of actual innocence 
presents a greater hurdle for petitioners to overcome than the Schlup standard.  See 
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (holding that a petitioner could demonstrate 
actual innocence by showing that it is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror 
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would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,”155 
the petitioner may pass through the Schlup gateway and have his or her 
constitutional claims heard on the merits.156  In recognizing an equitable
exception based on a credible showing of actual innocence, the Ninth 
Circuit joined the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.157  The circuits in 
support of an actual innocence exception found that: (1) Congress did
not remove federal courts’ equitable powers in habeas proceedings;
(2) recognition of an actual innocence exception to the AEDPA’s 
limitations period is consistent with the AEDPA’s underlying principles; 
and (3) the doctrine of constitutional avoidance further warrants the 
circuits’ conclusion.158 
The Ninth and Sixth Circuits declared that Congress intended for the 
actual innocence exception to apply to the AEDPA’s limitation period.159 
When Congress enacted the AEDPA, Congress was working against the 
background of Murray v. Carrier160 and Schlup v. Delo,161 in which the
155. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 
156. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).  In a petition for 
habeas relief from the petitioner’s conviction of first degree sex abuse and first degree 
sodomy, the Ninth Circuit held that although a credible showing of actual innocence 
under Schlup v. Delo excuses the AEDPA’s statute of limitations period, the petitioner
failed to present sufficient evidence of actual innocence to permit review of his
constitutional claims on the merits.  Id. at 931. 
157. See San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that although the petitioner did not raise a claim of actual innocence, the court may
consider an untimely AEDPA petition if the court would “endorse a ‘fundamental 
miscarriage of justice’ because it would require that an individual who is actually
innocent remain imprisoned”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 158; Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d
1228, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[A] sufficiently supported claim of actual innocence 
creates an exception to procedural barriers for bringing constitutional claims, regardless 
of whether the petitioner demonstrated cause for the failure to bring these claims forward 
earlier.”); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Similar to our holding in
the equitable tolling context, we conclude that against the backdrop of the existing 
jurisprudence and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, Congress enacted [the 
AEDPA’s] procedural limitation consistent with the Schlup actual innocence exception.”). 
158. Lee, 653 F.3d at 935–36; Souter, 395 F.3d at 599; see also San Martin, 633
F.3d at 1267–68; Lopez, 628 F.3d at 1230–31. 
159. Lee, 653 F.3d at 934; Souter, 395 F.3d at 599. 
160. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).  Although the Supreme Court held that any attorney error
short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause for a procedural 
default, id. at 497, the Court held that “‘[i]n appropriate cases’ the principles of comity
and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice ‘must yield to the imperative
of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration,’” id. at 495 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). 
161. 513 U.S. 298, 327–28 (1995) (holding that if a petitioner brings forth new 

















    












Supreme Court held that a showing of actual innocence was sufficient to 
overcome a procedurally defaulted habeas corpus petition.162  Additionally,
federal courts have consistently had equitable discretion to hear the 
merits of claims involving procedural failings if the failure to do so
would result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” like a conviction,
incarceration, or execution of an actually innocent person.163  Thus, the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits both contend that “[a]bsent evidence of Congress’s 
contrary intent, there is no articulable reason for treating habeas claims
barred by the federal statute of limitations differently.”164 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found that the actual innocence 
exception does not go against the AEDPA’s intent to eliminate abuse of 
habeas petitions.165  The Sixth Circuit agreed on this point and explained
that an actual innocence exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
provisions does not foster abuse and delay but rather recognizes that, in
certain extraordinary and rare situations, the interests of finality, comity,
and federalism “must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally
have convicted him” in light of the new evidence, he may overcome the procedural 
barriers that would otherwise bar his path and have a federal court consider his habeas
petition on the merits).
162. Souter, 395 F.3d at 599.  The Sixth Circuit concluded that based on existing
jurisprudence and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, Congress enacted the 
AEDPA’s procedural limitation consistent with the Schlup actual innocence exception.
Id.  Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations based 
on a credible showing of actual innocence is appropriate. Id.
163. Lee, 653 F.3d at 933–34 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502
(1991)); see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 320–21 (discussing courts’ ability to exercise 
equitable principles to prevent miscarriages of justice).  The Supreme Court stressed the 
need in a free society for “an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to 
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty.” McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 495 (quoting Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976)). 
164. Lee, 653 F.3d at 934 (quoting Souter, 395 F.3d at 599).  Congress adopted a 
more stringent actual innocence exception in the AEDPA’s successive petition and
evidentiary hearing provisions, requiring that the factual predicate of the claim could not 
have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence and imposing a “clear 
and convincing” standard of proof.  Souter, 395 F.3d at 598–99 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2244(b)(2)(B), 2254(e)(2) (2006)).  The Sixth Circuit explained that the AEDPA’s 
narrower actual innocence exception “is indicative, not of Congress’s desire to exclude 
the exception with regards to the limitations period, but rather of its intent to limit the
scope of the exception in those two specific areas.”  Id. at 599.  Thus, in looking at the 
absence of an exception in § 2244(d)(1), the Sixth Circuit found that the more reasonable 
inference to draw is that “Congress intended not to alter the existing jurisprudential 
framework which allowed for a showing of actual innocence to overcome a procedural 
default.”  Id.
165. Lee, 653 F.3d at 935.  As the Supreme Court has stated, “The miscarriage of 
justice standard is altogether consistent . . . with AEDPA’s central concern that the merits
of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited in the absence of a strong showing of
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unjust incarceration.”166  Moreover, although case law sets a “very high”
threshold for initiating equitable exceptions,167 recognition of the actual
innocence exception is consistent with the infrequent application of the 
doctrine of equitable tolling.168  In other words, habeas petitions that
advance a credible claim of actual innocence are “extremely rare,”169 and 
there is thus little danger that these extraordinary cases will swallow the 
rule of equitable tolling.170 
Furthermore, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits relied on the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, which provides that federal courts should 
refuse to rule on a constitutional issue if the court could resolve the case
on a nonconstitutional basis.171  According to the canon of constitutional
avoidance, courts must construe the statute to avoid serious constitutional 
problems, such as denying federal habeas relief to an actually innocent
petitioner.172  Barring a habeas petitioner who establishes a claim of actual
166. Souter, 395 F.3d at 600 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986)); 
see also Lee, 653 F.3d at 935 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 495).  As Judge Moore stated
in Souter, “It is only the extraordinary case . . . in which the habeas petitioner can present 
new evidence which undermines this court’s confidence in the outcome of the trial and
therefore requires assurance that it was free of non-harmless constitutional error.”  395 
F.3d at 600. 
167. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)).
168. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (“[T]he Schlup standard . . .
permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case.” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)); 
Spencer v. Sutton, 239 F.3d 626, 629–30 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that equitable tolling is 
appropriate only when extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control 
“prevented him from complying with the statutory time limit” (quoting Harris v. 
Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000))). 
169. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. 
170. Lee, 653 F.3d at 937. 
171. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case 
may be disposed of.”); see also Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance 
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2000)
(defending use of the canon of statutory construction when interpreting the AEDPA).
Critics, however, have called into question the federal courts’ general approach to
construction of the AEDPA’s provisions. See David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: 
Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 7
(2002) (“The avoidance canon . . . may extend judicial policy-making power by creating 
a constitutional penumbra, effectively extending the scope of a constitutional doctrine . . . .”);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983). 
172. Lee, 653 F.3d at 936; see Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 601 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Several courts have recognized that denying federal habeas relief from one who is 








     















innocence purely because the petitioner filed the petition after the 
limitations period raises a serious constitutional concern because of the
“inherent injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person, 
and the technological advances that can provide compelling evidence of 
a person’s innocence.”173 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits support the actual innocence exception and assert that there can
be no “stronger equitable claim for keeping open the courthouse doors 
than one of actual innocence.”174 
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE GATEWAY STANDARD
OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING  
OF TIME-BARRED PETITIONS
All federal courts should recognize an actual innocence exception to 
hear federal habeas corpus petitions of prisoners with valid claims after
the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period has run.  Because
courts consider the writ of habeas corpus as “the best and only sufficient
defence of personal freedom,”175 recognizing an actual innocence exception 
to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations “would enable the courts to 
continue to redress the most egregious injustice that can occur under our
173. Wyzykowski v. Dep’t of Corr., 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2000); see also
Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that if a petitioner can 
demonstrate actual innocence, the AEDPA’s limitations period “raises serious 
constitutional questions,” which “possibly render[] the habeas remedy inadequate and 
ineffective”); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 378–79 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(discussing the “serious constitutional questions” that would arise if a petitioner’s actual 
innocence claim was barred from collateral review); Holloway v. Jones, 166 F. Supp. 2d
1185, 1190 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“[T]o utilize the one year statute of limitations contained 
in the AEDPA to preclude a petitioner who can demonstrate that he or she is factually
innocent of the crimes that he or she was convicted of would violate the Suspension
Clause contained in U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9 cl. 2, as well as the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment.”).  It is a well-established principle that punishing an 
innocent person or someone without culpability is at odds with the Constitution, 
including the Eighth Amendment.  See In re Davis, No. CV409 130, 2010 WL 3385081, 
at *41 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 432 n.2 
(1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“It also may violate the Eighth Amendment to imprison 
someone who is actually innocent.”). 
174. Lee, 653 F.3d at 934–35 (“[T]he individual interest in avoiding injustice is
most compelling in the context of actual innocence.” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324)); 
see also San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2011); Lopez v. 
Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2010); Souter, 395 F.3d at 599. 
175. See Zheng, supra note 47, at 2132 (quoting Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
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criminal justice system: the incarceration of an innocent person [as a
result of] an unconstitutional process.”176 
Critics of the actual innocence exception focus on the text of the 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, explaining that Congress did not 
explicitly include any exceptions for innocence.177 However, unlike the
other preclusive defenses under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is 
an “unprecedented restriction” on habeas corpus petitions.178  Before  
Congress enacted the AEDPA in 1996, the doctrine of habeas corpus was
never subject to strict time limitations.179  Moreover, in enacting the
AEDPA, Congress was working against the jurisprudential background 
of Schlup v. Delo, in which the Supreme Court held that a showing of 
actual innocence was sufficient to excuse a procedurally barred claim 
and have a federal court consider a defendant’s habeas petition on the 
merits.180  Courts have consistently held that a federal court could excuse
a procedural default resulting from an untimely filing “where a 
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent.”181 In the “absence of evidence to the
contrary,”182 and in light of existing jurisprudence, Congress enacted the
176. Id.; see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325 (“[C]oncern about the injustice that 
results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our
criminal justice system.”).
177. See, e.g., Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
that actual innocence does not relate to the statutory timeliness rules); Cousin v. Lensing,
310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that the AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations “contains no explicit exemption for petitioners claiming actual innocence of 
the crimes of which they have been convicted”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006)
(providing no explicit exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations for actual 
innocence).  The Sixth Circuit, however, explained that although Congress did adopt a 
narrow actual innocence exception in the AEDPA’s successive-petition and evidentiary-
hearing provisions, Congress did not desire to exclude the actual innocence exception
with regard to the limitations period.  Souter, 395 F.3d at 599.  The court held that the 
more reasonable inference is that Congress likely intended “not to alter the existing 
jurisprudential framework which allowed for a showing of actual innocence to overcome 
a procedural default.”  Id.
 178. Sussman, supra note 95, at 356. 
179. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
180. Souter, 395 F.3d at 598; see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326 (explaining the actual 
innocence exception to procedural bars on petitions). 
181. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 
182. Souter, 395 F.3d at 599.  The Supreme Court has explained that silence as to
an actual innocence gateway to procedural defaults should not be construed as a rejection
of the equitable principles traditionally governing claims of habeas corpus.  See Holland
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (noting that it is improper to “construe a statute























   
 
      
    
 
 
   
   





procedural limitation in the AEDPA consistent with the Schlup actual
innocence exception. 
Additionally, although Congress enacted the AEDPA to alleviate the
burden on the federal courts and to contain the threat to the principles of
finality and comity,183 an actual innocence exception does not threaten 
the leading principles of the AEDPA.184  Under Schlup, a petitioner’s
“otherwise-barred claims [may be] considered on the merits . . . if his 
claim of actual innocence is sufficient to bring him within the ‘narrow 
class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”185 
For a claim of actual innocence to be credible, a claim that constitutional
error has caused the conviction or imprisonment of an innocent person
requires that the petitioner “support his allegations of constitutional error 
with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was 
not presented at trial.”186  Because such required evidence is unavailable
in the majority of cases, a petitioner’s claim of actual innocence is 
“rarely successful.”187 
Nevertheless, opponents of the actual innocence exception maintain
that “states should be trusted to adjudicate federal-rights claims.”188 
However, according to a 1995 study by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
completed one year before Congress enacted the AEDPA restrictions,
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000))); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 
(2000) (holding that the AEDPA incorporated historical equitable principles governing 
habeas corpus petitions). 
183. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (discussing the AEDPA’s 
purpose of furthering “the principles of comity, finality, and federalism”); see also
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (discussing the importance of finality of 
judgments in the habeas corpus context); Murray, 477 U.S. at 487 (listing a reduction in 
finality of litigation and frustration of states’ sovereign powers as among the costs of
habeas corpus redress). 
184. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also Souter, 395 F.3d at 599–600 (“Inclusion of
an actual innocence exception to the limitations provisions does not foster abuse and
delay . . . .”). Moreover, the Supreme Court reasoned that in certain extraordinary 
situations, the interests of finality, comity, and federalism “must yield to the imperative
of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 495 (quoting 
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). 
185. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting 
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315). 
186. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; Souter, 395 F.3d at 590 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 
187. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 15, 17, 48–49 (2007), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (providing information that out of 
over 2,750 federal habeas petitions brought by state prisoners, only one petitioner made a 
successful Schlup claim).
 188. Zheng, supra note 47, at 2137; see also Friedman, supra note 44, at 489 
(“Federal courts [in following the principles of comity and federalism] should respect the 
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“only 1% of federal habeas corpus petitions were granted and another
1% were remanded to state courts.”189  Even after Congress enacted the
AEDPA’s limitations, the actual innocence gateway has had a minor
impact, if any, on comity and finality because the number of state prisoners
that file habeas petitions and the number of federal habeas petitions actually
granted has remained minimal.190  Therefore, “[a]t the very least, these low
figures show that permitting federal habeas corpus review of time-barred
petitions on the basis of actual innocence will not lead to any significant 
encroachment on states[’] rights.”191 
Finality also remains a legitimate concern of those opposing an actual 
innocence exception because habeas corpus review can involve 
considerable costs, extend the ordeal of trial, and exhaust judicial 
resources.192  Nonetheless, incarcerating or executing an innocent person
189. See Zheng, supra note 47, at 2137 (citing ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. 
DALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE 
COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 17 (1995), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/FHCRCSCC.pdf).  According to another report published by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the estimated grant rate nationwide for all noncapital cases filed in federal court 
in 2007 was at most 0.51%, or one in every 196 cases.  KING ET AL., supra note 187, at 
52 n.88. 
190. See Segal, supra note 120, at 247–48 (citing Brief for Former Prosecutors and
Professors of Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, House v. 
Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (No. 04-8990), 2005 WL 2367033 (reviewing the federal 
adjudication of Schlup claims electronically available on Westlaw or LexisNexis from
1995, the year of the Schlup decision, until 2005)).  In its amicus brief supporting the 
petitioner in House v. Bell, the amici found that during a ten-year period, federal habeas 
courts only issued 338 decisions regarding Schlup claims.  Id. The courts found that the 
petitioners had presented sufficient evidence of actual innocence to have the court 
consider their otherwise-barred claims on the merits in thirty-one of those cases, but
petitioners in only twenty of those cases received relief from their conviction or 
sentence.  Id. at 248.  This number is extremely small in comparison to the number of
prisoners who are “actually innocent” of their crimes.  See, e.g., C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., 
CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 53–62 (1996) 
(describing a ten-year research study of case samples and survey data of judges, 
prosecutors, public defenders, sheriffs, and police chiefs that resulted in a “conservative” 
estimation of 9,969 wrongful convictions, or 0.5% of the 1,993,880 convictions for index 
crimes, in 1990); Exonerations in the United States, 1989–2012, NAT’L REGISTRY 
EXONERATIONS (May 20, 2012), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ 
exonerations_us_1989_2012_summary.pdf (finding that more than 2,000 people who
were falsely convicted of serious crimes have been exonerated in the United States in the 
past 23 years). 
 191. Zheng, supra note 47, at 2137. 
192. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126–27 (1982).  Justice Harlan explained
that
“[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in 













   
  


















“should far outweigh the desired termination of litigation.”193  Therefore,
the actual innocence gateway is consistent with congressional intent and
the AEDPA’s underlying principles. 
Finally, recognizing an actual innocence exception to the AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations is appropriate because the Supreme Court has
already recognized that the limitations period may be equitably tolled in 
extraordinary circumstances.194  Critics argue that an actual innocence
exception would only provide petitioners an opportunity to relitigate a 
settled matter, fabricate new evidence, and attempt to bring forth the
same evidence again but with a different approach.195  However,  many  
commentators note that the argument that actual innocence exceptions
lead to abuse is unfounded, because federal courts rarely encounter 
litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a 
conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be
restored to a useful place in the community.”
Id. at 127 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
193. See Zheng, supra note 47, at 2138 (quoting Friendly, supra note 66, at 150). 
Courts should “not neglect the public fear and distrust that may arise as a result of
incarcerating the innocent.”  Id.  Furthermore, in the case of actual innocence, providing 
a remedy for constitutional error in an initial federal habeas petition actually promotes 
finality and conserves judicial resources. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492
(1991) (“If reexamination of a conviction in the first round of federal habeas stretches 
resources, examination of new claims raised in a second or subsequent petition spreads 
them thinner still.  These later petitions deplete the resources needed for federal litigants 
in the first instance, including litigants commencing their first federal habeas action.”). 
Without the burden of a strict time constraint, petitioners with meritorious claims of
actual innocence are more likely to carefully prepare and develop their cases in a first
habeas petition, which will in turn help conserve judicial resources.  Zheng, supra note 
47, at 2138. 
194. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).  Federal circuit courts 
have also recognized that the limitations period may be equitably tolled in cases of
extraordinary circumstances.  See, e.g., Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1008 
(6th Cir. 2001) (providing examples of other circuits who have recognized the
“extraordinary circumstances” requirement), overruled on other grounds by Plummer v. 
Warren, 463 F. App’x 501 (6th Cir. 2012).  Furthermore, the recent trend of federal
circuit courts to recognize an actual innocence exception to the AEDPA’s limitations 
period suggests that the standard established in Schlup may become the accepted
standard by which petitioners with actual innocence claims could have their time-barred 
habeas petitions heard.  See supra Part IV.B.2.
195. See Segal, supra note 120, at 237.  Justice O’Connor noted that “the federal 
courts will be deluged with frivolous claims of actual innocence by prisoners who,
refusing to accept the jury’s verdict, demand[] a hearing in which to have [their]
culpability determined once again.’”  Id. (quoting “The Streamlined Procedures Act of 
2005”: Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3035 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13 (2005) (statement 
of Thomas Dolgenos, Chief, Federal Litigation Unit, Philadelphia District Attorney’s 
Office), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/dolgenos_10_11_05_
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meritorious claims of actual innocence in habeas petitions.196  Moreover,
holding that a credible claim of actual innocence is an equitable exception 
to the AEDPA’s limitations period is “entirely ‘consistent with [courts’]
sparing application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.’”197 
The Ninth Circuit, along with other circuits, has applied equitable
principles to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations in a variety of contexts.198 
If equitable tolling is appropriate in those contexts, courts should also 
excuse untimely habeas petitions that invoke the “ultimate equity”— 
actual innocence.199  As the Ninth Circuit explained in Lee, “[i]t would 
seem odd indeed that, under Holland, a petitioner could receive the benefit
of equitable tolling for attorney error and yet be denied habeas review 
upon making a credible showing of actual innocence.”200  Thus, the
Supreme Court should harmonize the two avenues for equitable exceptions 
to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
Although the government must conserve limited judicial resources and 
further the principles of finality and comity in criminal trials,201 ultimately 
courts have a duty to ensure that prisoners are actually guilty of the 
crimes for which they are convicted and sentenced.202  Therefore, the
Supreme Court should adopt the gateway standard of actual innocence as 
an exception to time-barred petitions because the exception serves as an
196. Id. (citing Bellamy, supra note 78, at 39); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 
298, 324 (1995) (“[E]xperience has taught us that a substantial claim that constitutional 
error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare.”).  In fact, courts 
have rarely sustained habeas petitions containing a claim of actual innocence because the 
burden of proof to establish a claim of actual innocence is so rigorous.  See Jordan
Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 377 & n.370 (1993) 
(citing cases denying relief based on claims of actual innocence). 
197. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting
Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
198. See supra notes 34, 108–11 and accompanying text. 
199. Lee, 653 F.3d at 935 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
200. Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010); Spitsyn v. Moore,
345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We . . . conclude that the misconduct of Spitsyn’s 
attorney was sufficiently egregious to justify equitable tolling of the one-year limitations 
period under AEDPA.”)). 
201. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) (listing the values intruded
upon by habeas corpus).  The individual criminal defendant, the victim of the crime, and 
society in general each have an interest in insuring that there will eventually be the 
assurance and closure that comes at the conclusion of litigation.  Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
202. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986) (describing the “powerful 
and legitimate interest” of an innocent prisoner in obtaining relief); see also Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986) (explaining the importance of review of claims 






















additional “safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an
unconstitutional loss of liberty.”203 
Several cases illustrate that an actual innocence exception is fundamental 
in ensuring the equitable application of the AEDPA’s provisions to
habeas corpus petitions.  For example, in Souter v. Jones, the Sixth 
Circuit ordered the district court to consider Souter’s habeas petition, 
even though it was time barred, because Souter “presented new evidence 
which raise[d] sufficient doubt about his guilt and undermine[d] confidence 
in the result of his trial.”204 
In 1979, Kristy Ringler died of a severe head wound shortly after her 
body was found in the middle of the road.205  A forensic pathologist
hired by the state concluded that Ringler’s injuries were consistent with 
being hit by a car and not with a homicide.206  Twelve years later, after 
the election of a new sheriff who had committed to reviewing unsolved 
homicide files, the State reopened the case and prosecuted Souter for
murder, arguing that he had hit Ringler with his whiskey bottle.207  At  
trial, the prosecution’s evidence consisted primarily of a whiskey bottle 
found near the victim and expert testimony that the bottle previously had
a sharp edge that could have been used to kill the victim.208  Souter was 
convicted, and after procedurally defaulting on his state habeas claims,
he sought federal habeas relief.209 
In his federal habeas petition, Souter presented several pieces of 
exculpatory evidence, including two expert witnesses’ recantations of 
trial testimony and photographs from the crime scene showing blood 
stains inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory.210  Specifically, two of 
the three forensic experts who testified for the prosecution at trial
recanted their testimony, stated that it was “unlikely” that the bottle 
could have caused the victim’s injuries, and discredited the credentials
of the state’s third expert witness.211  Souter also presented extensive
evidence from the bottle manufacturer and forensic technicians that
203. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 
n.31) (discussing the need in a free society for this additional safeguard). 
204. Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 597 (6th Cir. 2005). 
205. Id. at 581. 
206. Id. at 582. 
207. Id. at 582–83. 
208. Id. at 581–83. 
209. Id. at 583. 
210. Id. at 583–84.  Souter introduced previously unavailable pictures of the crime 
scene that showed the back of the victim’s clothes covered in blood, even though she
was found lying on her back and little blood was visible at the time.  Id. at 591–92.  The 
large amounts of blood visible in these photographs made it significantly less likely that 
Souter could have hit or moved Ringler without getting any blood on himself.  Id. at 592. 
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proved that the bottle could not have had a sharp edge, as well as an
affidavit from the police laboratory technician, who said that the bottle 
did not have a sharp edge when it was recovered after the murder.212 
Based on the extensive evidence of his actual innocence, the Sixth 
Circuit allowed Souter to pass through the Schlup gateway and argue the 
merits of his underlying constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and due process violations.213  Ultimately, the court exonerated 
and released Souter from state prison after serving thirteen years for a
murder he did not commit.214  However, if Souter had filed his federal 
habeas petition in a circuit that does not recognize an equitable exception 
based on actual innocence, the court would have dismissed his habeas 
corpus petition and would never have considered his constitutional and
actual innocence claims.
Additionally, Lisker v. Knowles exemplifies the consequences of a 
strict and inflexible system that denies prisoners the opportunity to have 
their valid and reasonable claims of innocence heard.215  In 1983,  a  
woman named Dorka Lisker was killed in her home.216  The prosecution 
charged her seventeen-year-old son, Bruce Lisker, with the murder.217 
Although Lisker continued to assert his innocence to the police and told 
the detective that he believed the actual killer was another juvenile
named Michael Ryan, Lisker’s case went forward and a jury convicted
him of second-degree murder.218  In his habeas corpus petition, Lisker
presented new evidence that, among a number of things, the shoe prints
inside and around the house did not all belong to Lisker; that an object 
resembling the unidentified shoe which left prints in the guest bath and 
outside the house also made a mark on the victim’s head; and that there 
was a different suspect who was not “convincingly cleared” and whose 
involvement police appeared to have ignored despite compelling evidence.219 
Under all of these circumstances, the court held that “it would be a
miscarriage of justice for th[e] Court to dismiss the First Amended Petition 
212. Id. at 591. 
213. Id. at 602. 
214. Order and Judgment Approving Report and Recommendation, Souter v. Jones, 
No. 1:02-cv-00067-GJQ-HWB (W.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2005) (granting writ of habeas corpus).
215. Lisker v. Knowles, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
216. Id. at 1010. 
217. Id.
218. Id.
























   






as untimely.”220  Therefore, despite being time barred by the AEDPA’s
one-year statute of limitations, the court held that Lisker could pass
through the Schlup gateway and argue the merits of his constitutional 
claims.221  Lisker successfully established constitutional errors and was 
released after being incarcerated for twenty-six years.222 
However, after the panel in Lee v. Lampert held that there was no actual
innocence exception to override the AEDPA’s statute of limitations,223 
the State of California filed a motion to reopen the habeas proceedings in 
an effort to return Lisker, an exonerated man, to prison based on a 
procedural technicality.224  This occurred prior to the Ninth Circuit’s en
banc decision holding that a credible claim of actual innocence constitutes 
an equitable exception to the AEDPA’s limitations period.225  Ultimately
a federal judge denied the motion,226 yet the case illustrates the potential
consequences of an inflexible system.
Like the petitioners described above, the petitioner in Souliotes v. 
Evans227 presents a compelling case for habeas relief, providing new 
reliable evidence of actual innocence such that any “reasonable 
juror” would arguably conclude the charges against Souliotes had not
been proven “beyond a reasonable doubt.”228  In his federal habeas corpus
petition, Souliotes presented both a claim that was potentially timely
under § 2244(d)(1),229 as well as affiliated claims that would otherwise
be barred but which Souliotes sought to bring through the Schlup actual
innocence gateway.230 
220. Id. at 1042.  For a more detailed discussion of the factual and procedural 
background, see Scott Glover & Matt Lait, New Light on a Distant Verdict, L.A. TIMES
(May 22, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/22/local/la-me-lisker22may22. 
221. Lisker, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 1042. 
222. See Matt Lait, Judge Rejects Motion To Put Bruce Lisker Back in Prison, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/09/local/la-me-lisker-201010
09. 
223. Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 653
F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011). 
224. See Lait, supra note 222.  “The state attorney general’s office filed a motion 
. . . seeking to have Lisker sent back to prison on a technicality, citing a [Ninth Circuit]
ruling in another case [holding that] inmates cannot file ‘untimely’ petitions for release 
even if they can prove they are innocent.” Id.
225. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 945. 
226. See Lait, supra note 222. 
227. Souliotes v. Evans, 622 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 654 F.3d 902 (9th
Cir. 2011). 
228. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326–27 (1995) (“[T]he Carrier ‘probably
resulted’ standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the 
miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner . . . raises a claim of actual innocence to
avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of his constitutional claims.”).
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2006). 
230. Souliotes, 622 F.3d at 1176 (claiming actual innocence, ineffective assistance 
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Initially, Souliotes sought equitable tolling based on his counsel’s
reliance on an “ambiguous” docket entry.231  Because Souliotes’s attorney
mistook October 22, 2002, rather than October 16, 2002, to be the triggering
date for the AEDPA’s one-year deadline, Souliotes’s attorney filed his 
federal habeas petition five days past the limitations period.232  The  
Ninth Circuit held that the clerical error did not amount to “extraordinary
circumstances” that warranted a grant of equitable tolling.233 
Despite his untimely filing, Souliotes asserted that he could pursue his 
remaining claims under the Schlup actual innocence gateway, which was
the only remaining mechanism Souliotes had to present his affiliated
constitutional claims.234  In recognizing a credible claim of actual
innocence as an exception to the AEDPA’s limitations period, the Ninth 
Circuit provided the district court with discretion to determine whether 
Souliotes could present his otherwise time-barred claims.235  On remand,
the district court considered all of the evidence, including the newly
discovered evidence.236  The district court subsequently found that
Souliotes made a sufficient showing of actual innocence to serve as an
equitable exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, thereby 
allowing the court to consider all of Souliotes’s constitutional habeas 
claims on the merits.237 
Souliotes presented a compelling case for habeas relief because the 
new scientific evidence and the unreliability of the prosecution’s eyewitness 
cast considerable doubt on the accuracy of the verdict.238  Furthermore, 
in pursuing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Souliotes “could
likely show that his conviction was not the product of an error-free 
231. Id. at 1180. 
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1181. 
234. Id.
235. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
236. Souliotes v. Hedgpeth, No. 1:06-cv-00667 OWW, 2011 WL 4433098, at *6 
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2011) (order granting request to hold evidentiary hearing). 
237. Souliotes v. Hedgpeth, No. 1:06-cv-00667 AWI MJS HC, 2012 WL 2684972,
at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2012) (order adopting magistrate judge’s Findings and
Recommendation concluding that Souliotes made a sufficient showing of actual 
innocence).  For purposes of the Schlup gateway, Souliotes did not need to show that he 
was actually innocent of the crime he was convicted of committing; instead, he only had
to show “that ‘a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”  Carriger v. 
Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 
298, 316 (1995)).

























    
trial.”239  In the first trial, Souliotes’s trial counsel presented evidence, 
including testimony from fourteen witnesses, to undermine the prosecution’s
case, which ultimately resulted in a hung jury.240  However, at the second 
trial, the same attorney called only one witness, an individual who had 
testified for the prosecution at the first trial.241  The reduced level of
representation at trial, coupled with new and sufficient evidence that was 
not available at trial, is the type of situation the Supreme Court intended
to protect with the Schlup gateway.
Nevertheless, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s recent protection of 
individual liberty against unjust and illegal incarceration or execution,242 
the federal circuit courts that fail to recognize an actual innocence 
exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations still allow the incarceration 
of innocent individuals.  But continued incarceration of innocent individuals
is of secondary concern compared to limited review for capital defendants
because losing the opportunity for federal postconviction review on 
account of a strict statutory deadline can mean the difference between life
and death, as capital defendants are unlikely to receive any further 
review before execution.243 For example, similar to Souliotes, who was 
incarcerated for three murders by arson, Cameron Todd Willingham was 
convicted and incarcerated in Texas for allegedly setting a fire in 1991 
that killed his three daughters.244  However, unlike Souliotes, who was 
recently allowed to present his otherwise time-barred claims asserting 
239. Id. at 1187 n.7. 
240. Id. at 1176. 
241. Id.
242. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (reversing 
judgment of the trial court granting petition for habeas relief from the petitioner’s
conviction of first degree sex abuse and first degree sodomy, where although the court
held that a credible showing of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo excuses the one-
year statute of limitations period, the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence of 
actual innocence to permit review of his constitutional claims on the merits). 
243. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996) (“Dismissal of a first federal 
habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the petitioner the 
protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an important interest in human 
liberty.”).  For capital defendants, a dismissal of a federal habeas petition denies 
prisoners the only mechanism by which they may present claims of actual innocence, 
thus resulting in the loss not only of their liberty, but also of their lives.
244. See Cameron Todd Willingham: Wrongfully Convicted and Executed in Texas, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Cameron_Todd_Willing 
ham_Wrongfully_Convicted_and_Executed_in_Texas.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). 
Willingham was convicted of capital murder after arson investigators concluded that
twenty indicators of arson led them to believe that an accelerant had been used to set the 
fire inside his home.  Todd Willingham: Innocent and Executed, NAT’L COALITION TO 
ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/index.cfm?content=106 (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2013).  During the trial, the prosecutors also presented testimony from jailhouse 
informant Johnny E. Webb, a drug addict on psychiatric medication, who claimed 
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new reliable evidence of actual innocence,245 Willingham was not allowed 
to present such evidence after the limitations period had expired.246 
Ultimately, Willingham was executed despite the overwhelming evidence
of his actual innocence.247 
Willingham filed a petition for federal habeas relief in April 1998, but the
district court denied relief.248  Prior to his execution in 2004, Willingham’s 
attorneys tried again, presenting expert testimony regarding a new arson
investigation to the state’s highest court, as well as to Texas Governor 
Rick Perry.249 The independent investigation, reported by Gerald Hurst
of the Chicago Tribune, found that prosecutors and arson investigators
used arson theories that had since been rejected by scientific advances, and 
concluded that it was possible the fire was accidental.250  The court did 
not grant relief and Willingham was executed on February 17, 2004.251 
If Willingham had filed his habeas petition in a circuit that recognized an
equitable exception based on actual innocence, such as the case in
Souliotes, the court may not have dismissed his habeas corpus petition 
and Willingham might still be alive today. 
Whether an innocent person remains unjustly incarcerated or even 
executed can depend on the circuit court in which the petitioner files the 
habeas petition.  In recognizing an actual innocence exception for equitable
tolling of time-barred petitions, the Supreme Court would correct the 
245. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 246. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 244; see also David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did 
Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.newyorker 
.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann.
 247. Grann, supra note 246. 
248. Willingham v. Johnson, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-0409-L, 2001 WL 1677023, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2001). 
249. Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Texas Man Executed on Disproved Forensics: 
Fire That Killed His 3 Children Could Have Been Accidental, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9, 2004),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-12-09/news/0412090169_1_cameron-todd-will 
ingham-arson-fire-fire-scene. 
250. Id.; see also Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, Ex parte Willingham, No. 24,2670(B)
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2004), available at http://www.texasobserver.org/wp-content/legacy/
uploads/files/hurstreport.pdf. Coincidentally, less than a year after Willingham’s execution, 
arson evidence presented by some of the same experts who had appealed for relief in 
Willingham’s case helped exonerate Ernest Willis in Texas.  Mills & Possley, supra note 
249.  The experts noted that the evidence in the Willingham case was nearly identical to 
the evidence used to free Willis from death row. Id.
 251. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 244.  For information about other cases in
which prisoners were executed despite strong evidence of their innocence, see Executed 
but Possibly Innocent, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/






















   
        
 
inconsistency among federal circuit courts.  The Court would also provide a
more complete and effective legal avenue of relief to the wrongfully
convicted while enforcing a system that weeds out frivolous claims and 
balances the interests of finality, comity, and judicial efficiency.  “If
there is any core function of habeas corpus . . . it would be to free the
innocent person unconstitutionally incarcerated.”252 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By its recent decision in Lee v. Lampert, the Ninth Circuit recognized 
how the actual innocence exception is consistent with the AEDPA’s 
underlying principles,253 furthers the purpose of habeas corpus,254 and 
protects an individual interest in avoiding injustice255 without interfering 
with congressional intent.256  In affirming this holding, the Supreme 
Court would empower all federal courts to call on their equitable powers, 
including both equitable principles already applied to the AEDPA’s
statute of limitations as well as the actual innocence exception, in assessing 
the timeliness of each actual innocence claim a petitioner asserts. When
a person’s life is on the line, allowing even one innocent person to 
remain unjustly incarcerated or executed goes against the core function 
of our criminal justice system.257 
252. Alexander v. Keane, 991 F. Supp. 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
253. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[The actual 
innocence exception] does not foster abuse or delay, but instead recognizes that in 
extraordinary cases, the societal interests of finality, comity, and conserving judicial
resources ‘must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.’”
(quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986))). 
254. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (emphasizing the 
significance of habeas jurisprudence to AEDPA interpretation); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 
391, 424 (1963) (concluding that individual liberty outweighed concerns for finality and 
federalism), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (“Conventional notions of finality of litigation have 
no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is 
alleged.”). 
255. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1995) (recognizing the injustice that 
results from convicting an innocent person).
256. See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
Congress enacted the AEDPA’s statute of limitations “consistent with the Schlup actual 
innocence exception”).
257. See Zheng, supra note 47, at 2138 (“[E]ven those gravely concerned about 
conservation of judicial resources have acknowledged that ‘the policy against incarcerating or
executing an innocent man . . . should far outweigh the desired termination of litigation.’”
(quoting Friendly, supra note 66, at 150)). 
1332
